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ABSTRACT

Problematic relations between the White House and the U.S.
Department of Justice stand out even amidst the broader tumult of President
Donald Trump's first year in office. With respect to written policy restricting
contacts between the White House staff and the Department, the Trump White
House hasfollowed the generalcontours ofpredecessor administrations.Those
policies recognize that White House contacts restrictions vary with the
Department's complex functions, restrict channels of contact, and restrict
personnel authorizedto make contacts. They also grant limited exceptions where
White House-Department contact is required to assist the President in the
performance of a constitutionalduty and contact would be appropriatefrom a
law enforcement perspective. A number of episodes, however, suggest that the
Presidentandsenior administrationofficials have not honored the spirit, and in
some cases the letter, of that contacts policy.
One ofthefrequent criticisms leveled againstPresidentTrump is that he
disregards many norms and traditions that have been observed by presidential
administrations of both parties for decades. Restrictions on White House
interference in criminal investigations do not merely protect norms. Rather,
those policies seek to prevent unconstitutionalconduct by the Presidentand his
politicalappointees. This Article demonstrates thatpolitical interference by the
Presidentundertaken in badfaith could violate the Take Care Clause even in the
absence of a criminal statute. Obstructive behavior is even worse. Whether or
not the Presidentis indictablefor the commission ofa statutory criminaloffense
of obstruction ofjustice duringhis tenure in office, this Article explains why the
Presidentmay violate the Take Care Clause independently ofcriminal offenses.
A principleofpoliticalnoninterferenceby the White House in thefederal
prosecutionfunction in particularmatters is consistent with Article II Neither
the Vesting Clause, the President'sposition atop the Executive Branch, nor the
President's. broader enforcement discretion defeat the anti-interference
principles commanded by the PresidentialOath and the Take Care Clause. It is
a question that goes to the very concept ofRule ofLaw itself However, political
processes, rather than justiciable legal proceedings, serve as the presumptive
source of Take Care Clause enforcement.
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But in a constitutional sense, the Attorney General remains
responsible to the President, and the President to the public.
Although true institutional independence is therefore
impossible, the Presidentis best served if the Attorney General
and the lawyers who assist him are free to exercise their
professional judgments. Just as important, they must be
perceived by the Americanpeople as beingfree to do so.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the course of the American experiment, it has become increasingly
clear that independence of the prosecutorial function from political
intermeddling is an essential ingredient to democracy grounded in the rule of
law. Insulation of the federal prosecution function from partisan politics is a
fundamental liberal value. Watergate was a particularly meaningful watershed.
In its wake, Attorney General Griffin Bell declared "the law has to be neutral,
and in our form of government there are things that are nonpartisan, and one is
the law and one is foreign intelligence." 2
Since then, for nearly 40 years, Presidents of both political parties have
established policies designed to prevent inappropriate contact between the White
House and the U.S. Department of Justice.' Congress, scholars, and
commentators have likewise affirmed the importance of prosecutorial and law
enforcement independence from White House interference.
This longstanding bipartisan tradition is under threat. First,
notwithstanding its written policy, the Trump Administration has undertaken a
series of actions that casts significant doubt on its commitment to the principles
of nonpartisan noninterference in prosecutorial, law enforcement, and
intelligence functions of the Department. Second, the criminal and
counterintelligence investigations of Trump Administration officials and
campaign associates in relation to Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential
campaign present investigative integrity and conflict-of-interest problems
unseen since Watergate.
Every administration since President Jimmy Carter has, at some point,
been accused of inappropriate contact or political influence on pending

I
Griffin B. Bell, Address to Department of Justice Lawyers on Independence of the
Department 5 (Sept. 6, 1978) [hereinafter the Bell Address] (transcript available at the U.S.
Department of Justice).
2

Id. at 3.

In this Article, I refer to the U.S. Department of Justice as "the Department" and specify
other departments and agencies of the federal government by their names. In addition, I refer to
such policies collectively as "White House contact policies," which are discussed more fully in the
Article. See infra Section IV.A.1.
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investigative matters.! Such controversies have been episodic and generally
served to underscore the overall political consensus that the Department be free
from undue political influence. However, early moves by President Donald
Trump, Attorney General Jeff Sessions, and White House subordinates differ in
magnitude and kind from modern predecessors.s
The relationship between the White House and Department of Justice is
delicate and fraught. The Department is complex. It has a number of roles and
functions that stand in very different relation to White House political leadership.
Evenhanded administration of the law, due process interests, and public
confidence require that rank political considerations do not drive prosecutorial
decisions. However, there are legitimate roles for political leadership with
respect to many Department functions. For example, the President has a
constitutional mandate to shape criminal justice policy and proposed legislation.
Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is both a Department component
and a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community.' In that role, the FBI has an
obligation to report to the President and his national security advisors about
threats.' Moreover, too much independence from political accountability can
hamper law enforcement accountability on a path to impunity.'
This Article focuses on the constitutional considerations that inform the
need to insulate prosecutorial decisions from undue political interference. I
reinforce the bipartisan tradition that holds such independence, as properly
understood, is an essential feature of the rule of law in American democracy. I

4
See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo & Michael S. Schmidt, Obama's Comments About Clinton's Emails
Rankle Some in the F.B.I., N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 16, 2015) (noting the White House assurances that
Obama "had not been trying to influence the investigation" after his public remarks that Hillary
Clinton's use of a private server did not endanger America's national security); Carol D. Leonnig,
ProsecutorSays Bush Appointees Interfered with Tobacco Case, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2007);

Don Van Natta, Jr., Analysis: White House Continues to Attack Starr, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 2, 1998)

(observing the Clinton White House defense strategy included public attacks on Independent
Counsel Ken Starr).
See infra Part II.
6

See

Members

of

the

IC,

OFFICE

OF

THE

DIR.

OF

NAT'L

INTELLIGENCE,

https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic#fbi (last visited Nov. 1, 2018)
("The FBI, as an intelligence and law enforcement agency, is responsible for understanding threats
to our national security and penetrating national and transnational networks that have a desire and
capability to harm the U.S.").
7

See

Intelligence

Branch,

FED.

BUREAU

OF

INVESTIGATION,

https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/intelligence-branch (last visited Oct. 5, 2018).
"FBI intelligence products are provided daily to the attorney general, the president, and to
customers throughout the FBI and in other agencies." See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE: MISSION STATEMENT, STRATEGIC GOALS, AND INTELLIGENCE
PROCESS, AUDIT REPORT 07-30 (2007), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0730/app2.htm.
8
See Justin Walker, FBIIndependence as a Threat to Civil Liberties: An Analogy to Civilian
Controlof the Military, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1011 (2018).
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seek to use the Article as a reminder of the theoretical underpinnings of this
principle, which is built on hard lessons of historical experience.
The President enjoys democratic legitimacy and faces political
accountability derived from election to national constitutional office. He serves
as the chief executive officer of the executive branch, sitting with a
constitutionally vested executive power to manage the branch.' Unitary
executive theory, however, does not account for the paradox created by Take
Care Clause obligations. Federal prosecutors and law enforcement officials
derive their power from the President's constitutional obligation to "take care
that the laws be faithfully executed""o as further provided for by Congress."
Here, I argue that, where the law creates a substantive criminal law and a
prosecutorial function, the Take Care Clause obligates the President to protect
the integrity of that criminal investigation from political interference, including
interference by the President himself. The same unitary executive-the Take
functions such as
Care Paradox-applies
to other Department
counterintelligence threat assessments, enforcement actions, and objective legal
analysis. By the same token, if the President interferes with the investigative or
prosecutorial function in bad faith,' 2 he can violate the Take Care Clause and his
Oath of Office.
While the principle of nonpartisan ntoninterference is sound, its scope
and constitutional underpinning are complicated. Almost all commentators agree
that a degree of prosecutorial noninterference is a public good. Some even
ascribe Department legal pronouncements near Delphic Oracle status. Others,
while valuing the principle of prosecutorial integrity, argue that the Department
sits in the midst of the command and control of a unitary executive headed by
the President. To them, democratic accountability must be derived from the
President's role as an elected supervisor, and warn about the dangers posed by
federal law enforcement unaccountable to the President." There is largely
agreement on the topline principle; there is disagreement as to the scope of the

9'
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § I ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.").
10
Id. § 3.
"
See, e.g., Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 1, 16 Stat. 162 (establishing the Department of
Justice and articulating various Department officers' statutory authorities and obligations). See Part
III for a more fulsome discussion of the 1870 Act.
12
See David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARv. L REv. 886, 888 (2016)
("Although the concept of bad faith can be slippery, its core meanings are fairly consistent
throughout the law and center on dishonesty, disloyalty, and lack of fair dealing."); see also
Andrew M. Wright, ConstitutionalGood Faith, 93 N.Y.U. L. REv. ONuNE 41 (2018) (critiquing
the view that Madison's ambition-versus-ambition arguments in the Federalist Papers amount to a
normative good rather than a prophylactic hedge; instead, the Constitution is an engine requiring
the institutional good faith of its officers in order to prevent the gears from grinding and, over time,
the engine from seizing up).
13
See Walker, supra note 8.
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independence principle, the existence of the President's legal authority to engage
the Department on any matter he deems fit, the wisdom of doing so on certain
matters, and his de facto power to interfere notwithstanding.
Accepting, at a minimum, that nonpartisan prosecutorial independence
is a modem constitutional value, how is it enforced? This question implicates
both regulatory authority and regulatory actors. Regulatory authority may be
grounded in constitutional law, statute, regulation, policy, and political norms.
Regulatory actors could include the President, agency heads, civil servants,
inspectors general, congressional actors, the media, and the constituent public.
The nature of regulatory authority will also bear on the relevant regulatory actors.
I conclude that functional Department independence relies largely on
executive branch policy, cultural norms, and political context rather than formal
legal rules. A formal legal "for cause" limitation on the President's removal
power of senior Department appointees who serve as "Officers of the United
States" under Article II may be unconstitutional.1 4 As such, the threat posed by
the Trump Administration will largely be limited, if at all, by political pressure.
The Take Care Clause is largely enforced by Congress rather than the Judiciary.
Thus, policing the President's good faith execution of laws will require
significant political courage by Department insiders and congressional
majorities.
Part II of this Article outlines some illustrative episodes reflecting
challenges in White House-Department relations challenges during the Trump
Administration's first term, as well as a few problematic instances in prior
administrations. Part III turns to the Take Care Clause and its interaction with
President's vested powers to manage the Executive Branch. Part IV analyzes
White House-Department contacts policies dating back to the Ford
Administration. There, I discuss the formal and informal methods of enforcement
of the independence principle.
II. WHITE HOUSE-DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE RELATIONS IN TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION YEAR ONE

Problematic relations between the White House and the Department of
Justice stand out even when measured against the broader tumultuous first year
of the Trump Administration. The Russia investigation, the travel ban, the

14
See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding unconstitutional a legislative
restriction requiring Senate advice and consent on the President's removal of a postmaster). Cf
Humphrey's Ex' v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding a "for cause" removal
restrictions for Federal Trade Commissioners in light of their quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
independent agency functions). In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the Supreme Court
treated an Independent Counsel under the now-expired Independent Counsel Act as an inferior
officer for constitutional purposes. That reasoning undergirded the Court's holding that the
imposition of a good cause standard for removal did not unduly impede the President's ability to
perform constitutional duties. See id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2018

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 121, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 4

360

WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW

[
121
[Vol.

immigration crackdown, and the President's pardon of disgraced former Arizona
sheriff Joe Arpaio have brought great stress to bear on already structurally
delicate relations between Main Justice (i.e., the headquarters and front office of
the Justice Department), the FBI, and the White House. Adding to these tensions,
President Trump offered frequent public criticism of senior Department
officials." Numerous commentators and former officials have criticized the
Trump White House for mismanagement of Department contacts.16 In the face
of such criticism, President Trump declared "I have the absolute right to do what
I want with the Justice Department." 17
This Section sets forth some of the recurring challenges presented by
actions taken by the President and other White House officials. Through
sustained criticism and assertions of categorical authority, President Trump has
brought tensions with the Justice Department to their highest levels since
President Nixon. But other Presidents in that period have also had trouble
navigating these choppy law enforcement waters.
President Trump has made unorthodox private contacts with Department
officials with responsibility for criminal investigations touching on his interests;
publicly criticized senior Department officials for prosecutorial and investigative
judgments; and accused former officials, including his predecessor, of politically
motivated surveillance and criminal conduct. All of these comments will be
See infra Section II.B (citing President Trump's criticisms of various current and former
officials and political opponents).
16
See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Obama's White House Counsel Weighs in on Trump's Lawyers,
NPR (Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/09/19/552169759/obamas-white-house-counselweighs-in-on-trumps-lawyers (reporting that Neil Eggleston used a speech at Columbia Law
School to "urge his successor to do more to police contacts between the White House and the
Department of Justice," noting "[d]iscussions of policy and national security are appropriate, he
said, but reports that Trump and other officials had asked the FBI about criminal investigations
would not have happened during Obama's tenure"). Preet Bharara, the former U.S. Attorney for
the Southern District of New York who was among those fired by President Trump, states:
The Justice Department, the FBI, the DEA, the U.S. Attorneys' Offices are all
in the executive branch in a particular branch that is different than all other
branches. It's the Department of Justice. It's not like the Department of
Education or Department of Weights and Measures or whatever else, ya know,
where policy is the most important thing. Here for us not to become a banana
republic it should be the case-it's the norm, and it should remain the normthat a President of the United States cannot dictate, by name, who should be
prosecuted because they're a political adversary, or who should be protected
because they're a political ally. And there are bits and pieces of evidence that
that, I think, norm-you know, that sacred standard that allows people to have
faith in whether or not justice is being done and is seen being done-is being
eroded.
Pod Save America: No Blood for Ego, CROOKED MEDIA (Oct. 16, 2017) (downloaded using
iTunes).
17
Excerpts from Trump's Interview with The Times, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/us/politics/trump-interview-excerpts.html.
President
Trump continued: "But for purposes of hopefully thinking I'm going to be treated fairly, I've stayed
uninvolved with this particular [Russian interference investigation] matter." Id.
iS
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heard by the FBI and others in the Department conducting investigations
touching on President Trump's personal and political interests. It exacerbates an
already charged political climate that presents challenges to the exercise of
independent professional judgment on the part of law enforcement and
prosecutors.
This kind of rhetoric from the chief executive further strains the
underlying tensions inherent in the White House relations with the Department.
While the White House issued a formal policy restricting White House staff
contacts with the Department, it proved inadequate to early administration
challenges.' 8 The threats White House contacts policies are designed to address
are particularly acute in the early days of the Trump Administration. Moreover,
as argued below, a formal policy is merely a prophylactic against violations of
the President's obligations under the Take Care Clause.
A. Background: Investigations into RussianElection Interference and
Hush Money Payments
Two investigations conducted by federal law enforcement have shaped
toxic dynamics between President Trump, the White House, and the Department.
The first investigation relates to Russian election interference. 19 The other
investigation of particular consequence relates to financial transactions designed
to buy confidentiality as to allegations of sexual conduct involving President
Trump before he took office. 20 President Trump has concrete interests in both of
these investigations, and they have already resulted in criminal convictions of
personal and political allies.21
1. The Russia Investigation
In 2016, it became increasingly clear to the U.S. Intelligence Community
that Russia undertook a complex, multi-pronged effort to influence the

Is

See supra PartII.

Referred to in this Article as the "Russia investigation."
Referred to in this Article as the "Hush Money investigation."
21
Federal prosecutors from the Special Counsel's office and U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of New York obtained convictions and guilty pleas from a number of people in
President Trump's orbit, including the President's campaign chairman, deputy campaign chairman,
national security advisor, and personal lawyer. For a list of criminal indictments and convictions
in the Russia investigation and Hush Money investigation, see Andrew Prokop, All of Robert
Mueller's Indictments and Plea Deals in the Russia Investigation So Far, Vox,
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/20/17031772/mueller-indictments-grand-jury
(last updated Oct. 10, 2018).
19

20
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presidential election between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump.22 In response,
officials launched a number of parallel and overlapping congressional,
counterintelligence, and criminal investigations into Russian election
interference.23 These inquiries, to varying degrees, have also turned attention to
Russian ties to President Trump as well as individuals and organizations
associated with him. It led to the appointment of a Special Counsel under
Department regulations designed to insulate, to a degree, investigations that
could focus on senior White House or Department officials.2 4 As discussed
below, the Special Counsel has drawn the sustained ire of President Trump.2 s
2.

The Hush Money Investigation

Federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York led an
investigation into a series of complex financial transactions orchestrated by
President Trump's former personal lawyer, Michael Cohen. These transactions
related to women alleging extramarital affairs with Donald Trump, either by

22
See generally OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSING RuSSIAN ACTIVITIEs
AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT U.S. ELECTIONS (UNCLASSIFIED) (2017). The Intelligence Community

issued the following top-line assessment:
We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in
2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia's goals were to undermine
public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and
harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and the
Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump.
We have high confidence in these judgments.
Id. at ii.
23
President Barack Obama directed the Intelligence Community to assess Russian
interference in the U.S. presidential election. See generally id. At a March 20, 2017, congressional
hearing, then-Director James B. Comey confirmed the existence of a formal Federal Bureau of
Investigation counterintelligence investigation. Due to some of the irregular White HouseDepartment contacts and conflicts of interest set forth in this section, on May 17, 2017, Acting
Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed Robert S. Mueller III as Special Counsel in order "to
ensure a full and thorough investigation of the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the
2016 presidential election." Office of the Deputy Att'y Gen., Order No. 3915-2017, Appointment
of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and
Related
Matters
(May
17,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/96723 1/download. Several congressional committees, including the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Senate
Judiciary Committee launched investigations related to Russian interference in the U.S.
presidential election, although they vary in scope, jurisdiction, and level of hindering partisanship.
See generally OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIvIES AND
INTENTIONS IN RECENT U.S. ELECTIONS (UNCLASSIFIED) (2017).
24
See General Powers of the Special Counsel, 28 C.F.R. § 600 (1999),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-200 1 -title28-vol2/pdf/CFR-200 1-title28-vol2-part600.pdf
25
See Linda Qiu, Truth-TestingTrump's 250-PlusAttacks on the Russia Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/18/us/politics/fact-check-trump-russiaelection-interference-.html.
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means of confidentiality agreements or "catch-and-kill" purchases of their stories
by media companies with ties to President Trump.26 Eventually, Cohen pleaded
guilty to eight criminal counts related to tax offenses, bank fraud, and campaign
finance violations.27 In an astonishing moment during his allocution of guilt,
Cohen directly implicated President Trump in a criminal conspiracy.28 While
Cohen's plea agreement did not include a cooperation agreement, subsequent
reports indicate he has been providing information to prosecutors, presumably
about the President. 29
Many of the Trump White House-Department relations challenges relate
to the Russia and Hush Money inquiries, and President Trump's reactions to
them. President Trump has also asserted categorical power beyond any of his
recent predecessors, declaring he has "the absolute right to do what I want with
the Justice Department." 30 While President Trump has been more disruptive to
the Department, he is not the only President to engage in questionable contacts
with, or exert inappropriate influence on, the Department.
B.

White House ConductProblem Areas

There are many ways the President and White House staff can bring
influence to bear on the Justice Department. In many areas, it is perfectly
appropriate for the President and his staff to influence the Justice Department:
national enforcement priorities, legislative proposals to modify the criminal
code, national budget resources, prison and detention policies, and interagency
coordination all call for national leadership. The President has appointment and
removal power for positions requiring Senate confirmation as well as a number
that do not. In addition, like all agencies in the federal government, the White
House may seek legal guidance from the Department.

26
See Brian Stelter, "Catch and Kill": How a Tabloid Shields Trump from Troublesome
Stories, CNN MONEY (Feb. 16, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/02/16/media/trump-catchand-kill/index.html.
27
Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Michael Cohen Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to
Eight Counts, Including Criminal Tax Evasion and Campaign Finance Violations (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/michael-cohen-pleads-guilty-manhattan-federal-courteight-counts-including-criminal-tax.
28
See Josh Gerstein, Laura Nahmias & Josh Meyer, Cohen Says He Paid Hush Money at
Candidate
Trump's
Direction,
POLITICO
(Aug.
21,
2018),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/2 1/michael-cohen-strikes-plea-deal-with-prosecutors790646.
29
See Emily Jane Fox, Michael Cohen Is the Latest Former Trump Ally to Talk to Mueller,
VANITY FAIR (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/09/michael-cohen-mueller.
30
Excerpts from Trump's Interview with The Times, supra note 17. President Trump
continued: "But for purposes of hopefully thinking I'm going to be treated fairly, I've stayed
uninvolved with this particular [Russia interference investigation] matter." Id.
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However, things change as specific law enforcement cases and
investigations become the subject of White House influence efforts. As discussed
more fully below, White House influence can raise constitutional problems
where the laws or functions at issue call for a presumption of noninterference by
political actors. Federal law enforcement's investigative decisions in specific
matters with specific parties are at the center of these concerns. Moreover, at
times, executive acts that would normally be within the presidential authority
become constitutionally suspect if undertaken in bad faith.
Below are particularly significant areas of problematic behavior if
undertaken by a President or his White House staff in order to inject narrowly
partisan or personal interests into federal law enforcement action. This Article
does not advance an argument that the means of White House influence
identified are categorically prohibited. Rather, they are presumptively
prohibited, and that presumption may be overcome if the influence is undertaken
in the justifiable service of the President's other constitutional duties.
1. White House Investigation Intervention
It would be particularly inappropriate for the President or White House
staff to direct federal law enforcement's investigative decisions without an
overriding justification. Decisions such as whether to initiate a criminal
investigation, seek a search warrant, seek a grand jury indictment, provide
witness immunity or protection, or agree to a plea deal are presumptively the
province of career prosecutors. The relatively few political appointees at the
Department along with the U.S. attorneys traditionally adhere to the same set of
guiding principles as the career agents and prosecutors-that law, facts, and
broader enforcement priorities, rather than partisan political considerations,
inform their investigative choices in specific cases.
As the Department considered Attorney General Jeff Sessions' legal
obligation to recuse himself from campaign-related investigations, President
Trump reportedly directed White House Counsel McGahn to prevent recusal.3 1
McGahn reportedly carried out the President's orders, lobbying Sessions not to
recuse. 3 2 On March 2, 2017, Sessions formally recused himself from "any
existing or future investigations of any matters related in any way to the

31
Michael S. Schmidt, ObstructionInquiry Shows Trump's Struggle to Keep Grip on Russia
Investigation, N.Y. TIs (Jan. 4,2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/us/politics/trumpsessions-russia-mcgahn.html ("President Trump gave firm instructions in March to the White
House's top lawyer: stop the attorney general, Jeff Sessions, from recusing himself in the Justice
Department investigation into whether Mr. Trump's associates had helped a Russian campaign to
disrupt the 2016 election.").
32
Id. Based on my experience as one of the few White House Counsel's Office attorneys
authorized, under limited circumstances, to communicate with the Justice Department, I see no
appropriate role for the Counsel to the President in a Department recusal determination.
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campaigns for President of the United States."33 In Senate testimony, Sessions
indicated that his recusal was required by Department regulations.34
2.

White House Contacts

White House communications with the Department short of directives to
control particular investigative decisions can become conduits for political
interference. The White House staff can exert pressure on Department officials
by means of threats, incentives, or information demands. White House demands
for information about specific cases could implicate secret grand jury materials,
information about confidential informants, undercover operations, or other
sources of information at risk of harm. Sometimes contacts can be appropriate or
innocuous, but they can also be implements of interference. Distorting White
House influence can even be inadvertent." That is why every administration
since President Nixon left office has regulated White House contacts. 6
According to then-FBI Director James Comey, President Trump
pressured him to drop the FBI's investigation of then-National Security Adviser
Michael Flynn." According to Comey, President Trump asked if Comey could
see his "way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go."" At that point, President
Trump almost certainly knew that Flynn had lied to the FBI agents who had
questioned him about the substance of conversations with Russian Ambassador

.

33
Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Statement on Recusal (Mar. 2,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-statement-recusal.
34
Open Testimony ofAttorney Generalof the United States, Jeff Sessions Before the S. Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (2017) [hereinafter Testimony] (statement of Att'y. Gen.
Sessions). Sessions testified: "Importantly, I recused myself not because of any asserted
wrongdoing on my part during the campaign, but because a Department of Justice regulation, 28
C.F.R. § 45.2, required it." That provision prohibits a Department employee, including the
Attorney General, from participation in a "criminal investigation or prosecution if he has a personal
or political relationship with.. . an elected official, a candidate (whether or not successful) for
elective, public office, a political party, or a campaign organization." 28 C.F.R. § 45.2(c)(1) (1996).
During the presidential campaign, Sessions, then a Republican Senator representing Alabama, was
an early endorser and regular advisor to Trump. See Michael M. Memoli & Brian Bennett, How
Jeff Sessions Came to Be an IntegralPartof Trump's Administration, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2017),
http://beta.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-sessions-20170302-story.html
(outlining
Sessions' early endorsement and active campaigning on behalf of the Trump campaign).
3s
As Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti put it, the President and other senior officials
"unintentionally can exert pressure by the very nature of their positions." Memorandum from Att'y
Gen. Benjamin Civiletti on Communication from the White House and Cong. (Oct. 18, 1979),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/10-18-1979.pdf
36
See infra Part IV.A.1.
3
Open Hearing with Former FBI Director James Comey, Hearing Before the S. Select.
Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of James
Comey, former Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
3
Id.
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Sergey Kislyak.3 9 Thereafter, Comey expressed concern to Attorney General
Sessions about the President's communication with Comey about a specific
investigation.4 0
In another instance, President Trump's first Chief of Staff, Reince
Priebus, reportedly requested that the FBI publicly contradict a newspaper report
about Trump associates' contacts with Russian intelligence services. 4 1 In So
doing, he likely violated the White House contacts policy in place.42 These
reports prompted former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to observe: "As the
attorney general, I would've felt it more appropriate for the chief of staff to
contact me and then I would have a conversation with the director of the FBI." 43
A third, troubling episode involved the White House Counsel. In March
2017, he accused former President Obama of ordering illegal wiretaps of Trump

3
As Acting Attorney General, Sally Yates had informed White House Counsel Don McGahn
about Flynn's dishonesty over two weeks earlier. See Riley Beggin, A Timeline of Sally Yates'
Warnings to the White House About Mike Flynn, ABC NEWS (May 8, 2017).
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-sally-yates-warnings-white-house-mikeflynn/story?id=47272979.
4
See Hearing, supra note 37 ("Shortly afterwards, I spoke with Attorney General
Sessions ... I took the opportunity to implore the Attorney General to prevent any future direct
communications between the President and me."). In subsequent Senate testimony, Attorney
General Sessions largely confirmed Comey's account:
Following a routine morning threat briefing, Mr. Comey spoke to me and my
Chief of Staff While he did not provide me with any of the substance of his
conversation with the President, Mr. Comey expressed concern about the
proper communications protocol with the White House and the President. I
responded to his comment by agreeing that the FBI and Department of Justice
needed to be careful to follow Department policies regarding appropriate
contacts with the White House. Mr. Comey had served in the Department of
Justice for the better part of two decades, and I was confident that Mr. Comey
understood and would abide by the Department's well-established rules
governing any communications with the White House about ongoing
investigations .... Our Department of Justice rules on proper communications
between the Department and the White House have been in place for years.
Testimony, supra note 34.
41
Isaac Arnsdorf, PriebusTalk with FBIAppearsto Break White House Rules, POLITICO (Mar.
17, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/reince-priebus-fbi-discussion-white-houserules-236192.
42
That policy limits discussion about particular investigations with specified senior
Department leaders to the President, Vice President, and White House Counsel (and his designees).
See Memorandum from Donald F. McGahn, II, Counsel to the President, on Communications
Restrictions with Personnel at the Dep't of Justice to All White House Staff, 1 (Jan. 27, 2017)
[hereinafter McGahn Memorandum]. For analysis of White House contacts policies across
administrations, see infra Part IV. Priebus evidently had not been designated to engage in such
discussion and had not sought clearance from White House lawyers. Arnsdorf, supranote 41.
43
Laura Jarrett, Can the White House Discuss Open Investigations with the FBI?, CNN (Feb.
24, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/24/politics/fbi-white-house-communications-ongoinginvestigation/.
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Tower." It did not have underlying evidentiary support.4 5 After President
Trump's unsupported wiretapping allegation, the New York Times reported, per
White House sources, that "Donald F. McGahn II, the president's chief counsel,
was working on Saturday to secure access to what Mr. McGahn believed was an
order issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court authorizing some
form of surveillance related to Mr. Trump and his associates.""
Putting aside the unfounded accusation, there are at least two problems
presented for proper White House-Department relations by this sequence of
events. First, as head of the executive branch, the President sent a signal to his
subordinates in law enforcement that he wants their powers turned toward his
predecessor. Second, it prompted his White House Counsel to pursue contacts
and information from the Department about an open investigation in order to
provide the President with cover for his claim.47 The President has an interest in
the fruits of intelligence collection in order to defend the United States from
Russian active measures. However, it would not be appropriate to access

4
Donald
J.
Trump
(@realDonaldTrump),
TwITTER
(Mar.
4,
2017),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/837989835818287106 ("Terrible! Just found out that
Obama had my 'wires tapped' in Trump Tower just before the victory. Nothing Found, This is
McCarthyism!"); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 4, 2017),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/837993273679560704 ("Is it legal for a sitting
President to be 'wire tapping' a race for president prior to an election? Turned down by court
earlier. A NEW LOW!"); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 4, 2017),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/837994257566863360 ("I'd bet a good lawyer could
make a great case out of the fact that President Obama was tapping my phones in October, just
prior to Election!"); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TwITTER (Mar. 4, 2017),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/837996746236182529 ("How low has President
Obama gone to tapp [sic] my phones during the very sacred election process. This is
Nixon/Watergate. Bad (or sick) guy!").
45
See, e.g., Lauren Carroll, DidDonald Trump Invent Claim that BarackObama TappedHis
6,
2017),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-oPhone?,
POLITIFACT
(Mar.
meter/article/2017/mar/06/did-donald-trump-invent-claim-barack-obama-tapped-/; Jana Heigl, A
Timeline of Donald Trump's False Wiretapping Charge, POLITIFACT (Mar. 21, 2017),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2017/mar/21/timeline-donald-trumps-falsewiretapping-charge/; Glenn Kessler, Trump's "Evidence"for Obama Wiretap Claims Relies on
Sketchy,
Anonymously
Sourced Reports,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
5,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/03/05/trumps-evidence-for-obamawiretap-claims-relies-on-sketchy-anonymously-sourcedreports/?tid=ainl&utm term-.fddbf6e33ddc; Michael D. Shear & Michael S. Schmidt, Trump,
Offering No Evidence, Says Obama Tapped His Phones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/us/politics/trump-obama-tap-phones.html.
4
Shear & Schmidt, supra note 45.
47
McGahn is one of the White House officials designated for contacts with the Department,
but that is only where such contact would assist the President in carrying out his constitutional or
statutory duties and would be appropriate from a law enforcement perspective. See McGahn
Memorandum, supra note 42.
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counterintelligence investigation evidence in order to substantiate an accusation
against a political opponent.48
3. White House Control Over Department Personnel
The President has the power to appoint Officers of the United States and
other positions so designated, some of which Congress or the Constitution
require to be confirmed by the Senate. The President also has the power to
remove those appointees. The Department of Justice has several hundred
presidential appointees. However, this well-established presidential authority
can become suspect when it is wielded in order to improperly influence
investigative functions.
The most notorious example was President Nixon's effort to fire
Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, which triggered the Saturday
Night Massacre.4 9 Previously, President George W. Bush's White House staff
had come under significant scrutiny for the allegedly politically motivated
removal of a number of U.S. attorneys. 0
President Trump appears to have fired James Comey as FBI Director, in
part, in order to short-circuit the Russia investigation.s" At the time, Comey had

48
Such concerns prompted a letter from the Democratic members of the House Judiciary
Committee. See Letter from Dem. Members of the H. Comm. on Judiciary to Hon. Dana J. Boente,
Acting Deputy Att'y Gen. (Mar. 6, 2017) (on file with author) ("In our experience, it is highly
unusual for the White House to seek access to a government application to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court. In almost any circumstance, it would be inappropriate to ask for that
information if the President and his associates are related to the underlying investigation.").
49
In the Saturday Night Massacre, President Nixon ordered his subordinates to fire the special
prosecutor. The Attorney General quit and his Deputy Attorney General was fired rather than
carrying out this improper order. Eventually, Solicitor General and then-Acting Attorney General
Robert Bork carried out President Nixon's order to fire Cox. See LEON JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND

THE POWER: THE PROSECUTION OF WATERGATE (1976).
so
For background on that controversy, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO

THE

REMOVAL

OF

NINE

U.S.

ATTORNEYS

IN

2006

(2008),

https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0809a/final.pdf.
sI
Letter from President Donald J. Trump to James Comey, FBI Dir. (May 9, 2017) (on file
with author) (informing Comey "you are hereby terminated and removed from office, effective
immediately"); see also Michael D. Shear & Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I DirectorJames Comey Is Fired
by Trump, N.Y. TIMEs (May 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/politics/jamescomey-fired-fbi.html. The Trump administration initially justified Comey's removal on the basis
of his handling of the investigation into former Secretary of State and Democratic presidential
nominee Hillary Clinton's email practices. See Rod J. Rosenstein, Memorandum for the Att'y
Gen., Restoring Confidence in the FBI (May 9, 2017) (on file with the author) (outlining criticism
of Comey's handling of the email affair and concluding that "[a]lthough the President has the
power to remove an FBI director, the decision should not be taken lightly").
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six years remaining in his ten-year term.52 Comey testified that President Trump
had sought an assurance of Comey's "loyalty" in a prior conversation about
Comey's continued service as director." President Trump characterized his
decision to fire Comey as acceptance of Department leadership
recommendations, but later it became clear that he initiated Comey's removal.5 4
The day after Comey's removal, President Trump reportedly told Russian
officials visiting the Oval Office that firing Comey relieved "great pressure"
from the Russia investigation.ss Later, President Trump acknowledged that the
Russia investigation factored into his decision to dismiss Comey11
52
Congress established the ten-year term for the FBI Director as a signal to the Executive that
it is a nonpartisan position. See S. REP. No. 93-1213 (1974) (Ten Year Term for FBI Director),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3726103/Senate-Judiciary-Report-1974.pdf.
5
Hearing,supra note 37. In his prepared testimony, Comey recounts the dinner conversation
that followed President Trump's question as to whether Comey liked his job and wanted to remain
in office:
A few moments later, the President said, "I need loyalty, I expect loyalty." I
didn't move, speak, or change my facial expression in any way during the
awkward silence that followed. We simply looked at each other in silence. The
conversation then moved on, but he returned to the subject near the end of our
dinner. At one point, I explained why it was so important that the FBI and the
Department of Justice be independent of the White House. I said it was a
paradox: Throughout history, some Presidents have decided that because
"problems" come from Justice, they should try to hold the Department close.
But blurring those boundaries ultimately makes the problems worse by
undermining public trust in the institutions and their work.
Near the end of our dinner, the President returned to the subject of my job,
saying he was very glad I wanted to stay, adding that he had heard great things
about me from Jim Mattis, Jeff Sessions, and many others. He then said, "I
need loyalty." I replied, "You will always get honesty from me." He paused
and then said, "That's what I want, honest loyalty." I paused, and then said,
"You will get that from me."
Id.; see also Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Comey
Demurred., N.Y. TIMEs (May 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/1 1/us/politics/trumpcomey-firing.html?_r=0.
54
See Letter from Donald J. Trump to James Comey, supra note 51 ("I have received the
attached letters from the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General of the United States
recommending your dismissal as the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I have
accepted their recommendation. False"); see also Letter from Att'y Gen. Jeff Sessions to President
Donald J. Trump (May 9, 2017) (on file with author) (recommending Comey's removal); Press
Release, Statement from the White House Press Sec'y (May 9, 2017) (on file with author)
("President Trump acted based on the clear recommendations of both the Deputy Attorney General
Rod Rosenstein and Attorney General Jeff Sessions.").
5
See Matt Apuzzo, Maggie Haberman & Matthew Rosenberg, Trump Told Russians that
Firing "Nut Job" Comey Eased Pressure from Investigation, N.Y. TIMEs (May 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/19/us/politics/trump-russia-comey.html.
56
Interview by Lester Holt, NBC News, with President Donald J. Trump (Mar. 11, 2017),
https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/pres-trump-s-extended-exclusive-interview-withlester-holt-at-the-white-house-941854787582 (when asked about his decision, President Trump
says that he was going to fire Comey regardless of Rosenstein's recommendation because "when
I decided to just do it I said to myself, I said, 'You know, this Russia thing with Trump and Russia
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White House Public Criticism of the Department

The President can also use the bully pulpit to influence particular
investigative matters. No element of a democratic government is beyond critique,
and there is an appropriate role for the President and White House staff to assess
the performance of the Department and its senior leaders. At the same time, the
White House should refrain from public assessments that are designed to impede
ongoing investigations, especially in order to protect the political fortunes or
personal legal exposure of the President.
President Trump has repeatedly called the Russia election interference
investigation a politically motivated "witch hunt."" He has dismissed various
factual reports or allegations about the Russia investigation categorically as "fake
news"58 and a "hoax."s' In addition to his withering criticism of the Attorney
General, President Trump has publicly criticized the Deputy Attorney General'
is a made-up story, it's an excuse by the Democrats for having lost an election"'); see also Tara
Golshan, Trump Admits He Fired Comey Over Russia. Republican Voters Don't Believe Him.,
Vox (May 15, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/15/15640570/trumpcomey-russia-republican-voters ("President Donald Trump has said the real reason he fired James
Comey from the FBI was because of the bureau's investigation into links between Trump's 2016
campaign associates and Russia."); James Griffiths, Trump Says He Considered "This Russia
Thing"
Before
Firing FBI
Director Comey,
CNN
(May
12,
2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/12/politics/trump-comey-russia-thing/index.html.
5
See, e.g., Noah Berman & Brian Bennett, Trump Lashes Out, Calls Russia Investigation a
"Witch Hunt," L.A. TIMEs (May 18, 2017) (responding to Mueller's appointment as Special
Counsel by calling the Russia investigation "the single greatest witch hunt of a politician in
American history!"); Dan Merica, Trump Defends Embattled Son, Calls Russia Controversy a
"Witch Hunt," CNN (July 12, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/12/politics/donald-trumprussia-son-fox-news/index.html (quoting President Trump calling the Russia probe "the greatest
witch hunt in political history" during a Fox News interview); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump),
TwrrTER
(Oct.
29,
2017),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/924639422066384896 ("The Dems are using this
terrible (and bad for our country) Witch Hunt for evil politics. . . ."). Incidentally, President
Trump's pick to replace Comey as FBI Director, Christopher Wray, told Congress that the Russia
investigation is not a witch hunt. See Dartunorro Clark, Wray Says Russia Probe Not a "Witch
Hunt,"
Pledges
"Independent"
FBI,
ABC
NEws
(Jul.
13,
2017),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/christopher-wray-pledges-independent-fbi-ifconfirmed-director-n78213 1.
58
See, e.g., Laura King, White House Again Bats Away CallforSpecialProsecutoron Russia,
L.A. TIMs (Feb. 26, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-essentialwashington-updates-white-house-again-bats-away-call-for-148812881 1-htmlstory.html
(reporting "President Trump again inveighed against Russia-related queries as "FAKE NEWS").
5
See Brian Stelter, Trump Says This is All a Hoax. Mueller, Congress and Facebook
Disagree., CNN (Sept. 22, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/22/media/trump-facebookrussialindex.html (noting President Trump "has used the 'Russia hoax' label at least once a month
since March").
6
See Excerpts from The Times Interview with Trump, N.Y. TIMEs (Jul. 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/us/politics/trump-interview-transcript.html?r-l
(including President Trump publicly questioning Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein's
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and the Acting FBI Director' during periods they have had authority over the
Russia investigation.
5. White House Investigation Targeting
Another area of concern is when the White House seeks to propose
particular targets of investigation. This raises the specter of the President using
the powers of the office to silence political rivals, which would be antithetical to
the rule of law and democratic values. As such, the American federal law
enforcement system relies primarily on the judgments of career prosecutors to
evaluate the law and facts related to potential crimes worthy of investigation or
prosecution. To be sure, there are times in which the President may have an
appropriate role in calling for an investigation in the national interest-for
example in his role as commander-in-chief of the military with a duty to defend
the nation. However, those cases are rare.
Breaking from this tradition, President Trump has called for various
investigations of political rivals or those involved in the Russia and Hush Money
investigations.62 He renewed his campaign calls for reopening the criminal
investigation of Hillary Clinton's email use.63 He has also called for
investigations of Democrats' alleged ties to a controversial uranium deal and
political loyalty because there are "few Republicans" where Rosenstein is from); see also Allan
Smith, Trump Lashes Out at His Deputy Attorney General for Beingfrom Baltimore-andHe's Not
from Baltimore, Bus. INSIDER (July 20, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-rodrosenstein-baltimore-2017-7 (focusing on President Trump's criticisms of Rosenstein).
61
See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TwrrrER (July 26, 2017),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890207082926022656 ("Why didn't A.G. Sessions
replace Acting FBI Director Andrew McCabe, a Comey friend who was in charge of Clinton
investigation but got ..... ); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TwiTrER (July 26, 2017),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890208319566229504 (". . .big dollars ($700,000) for
his wife's political run from Hillary Clinton and her representatives. Drain the Swamp!").
62
See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWrrTER (May 18, 2017),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/865207118785372160?lang-en ("With all of the illegal
acts that took place in the Clinton campaign & Obama Administration, there was never a special
counsel appointed!"); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TwirrER (Dec. 2, 2017),
("So General Flynn
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtruip/status/937141061343956992?lang=en
lies to the FBI and his life is destroyed, while Crooked Hillary Clinton, on that now famous FBI
holiday 'interrogation' with no swearing in and no recording, lies many times.. .and nothing
happens to her? Rigged system, or just a double standard?").
63
See, e.g., Louis Nelson, Trump Ratchets Up Callfor DOJ to Investigate Hillary Clinton,
PoLrTco (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/03/trump-doj-investigatehillary-clinton-244505 (quoting President Trump tweeting: "What about the deleted E-mails,
Uranium, Podesta, the Server, plus, plus.. .At some point the Justice Department, and the FBI,
must do what is right and proper"); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TwiTER (Dec. 2,
2017), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/937142713211813889?lang--en ("Many people
in our Country are asking what the 'Justice' Department is going to do about the fact that totally
Crooked Hillary, AFTER receiving a subpoena from the United States Congress, deleted and 'acid
washed' 33,000 Emails? No justice!").
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Democratic funding for the so-called "Steele dossier" outlining reports of
Russian collusion with the Trump campaign and other salacious allegations
about President Trump.'
He plaintively asked the Department when it would "act" to prosecute
former Hillary Clinton aide Huma Abedin.65 In calling for criminal investigations
of political opponents, President Trump has used Twitter to explicitly pressure
the Attorney General.6 6
6.

White House Assessments of Guilt or Innocence

Public statements by prosecutors and other law enforcement personnel
can have significant consequences for those under investigation and the broader
justice system. Prosecutors and other government officials carefully craft their
statements about ongoing or pending investigations and criminal cases-they do
not want to be accused of tainting or biasing the jury pool or create the perception

6

In one tweetstorm, President Trump stated:
Never seen such Republican ANGER & UNITY as I have concerning the lack
of investigation on Clinton made Fake Dossier (now $12,000,000) ... the
Uranium to Russia deal, the 33,000 plus deleted Emails, the Comey fix and so
much more. Instead they look at phony Trump/Russia . . . "collusion," which
doesn't exist. The Dems are using this terrible (and bad for our country) Witch
Hunt for evil politics, but the R's . . are now fighting back like never before.
There is so much GUILT by Democrats/Clinton, and now the facts are pouring
out. DO SOMETHING!
This tweetstorm is comprised of four successive tweets: Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (Oct. 29, 2017), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/924635359480303616;
Donald
J.
Trump
(@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER
(Oct.
29,
2017),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/924637600094326784;
Donald
J.
Trump
(@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER
(Oct.
29,
2017),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/924639422066384896;
Donald
J.
Trump
(@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER
(Oct.
29,
2017),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/924641278947622913.
65
See David Nakamura & Matt Zapotosky, Trump Urges Justice Department to "Act" on
Comey, Suggests Huma Abedin Should Face Jail Time, WASH. PosT. (Jan. 2, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2018/01/02/trump-urges-justicedepartment-to-act-on-comey-suggests-huma-abedin-should-face-jailtime/?utm term=-.30f2dfbc4bf; see also Chris Cillizza, The Stunning Abnormality of Donald
Trump's War on Justice (AndJustice), CNN (Jan. 2, 2018).
66
See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 24, 2017),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/889467610332528641
("So why aren't the
Committees and investigators, and of course our beleaguered A.G., looking into Crooked Hillarys
[sic] crimes & Russia relations?"); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 25,
2017), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/889788202172780544?lang-en
("Ukrainian
efforts to sabotage Trump campaign - 'quietly working to boost Clinton.' So where is the
investigation A.G. [sic]"); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 25, 2017),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/889790429398528000
("Attorney General Jeff
Sessions has taken a VERY weak position on Hillary Clinton crimes (where are E-mails & DNC
server [sic]) & Intel leakers!").
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that the outcome of a trial is a foregone conclusion. Such concerns are only
magnified when the White House megaphone is involved.
Even the most horrendous criminal acts call for circumspect public
statements. In fact, law enforcement officials are particularly careful when
commenting on egregious cases because criminal procedures are under close
examination and the public has intense interest in the outcome. In support of
these principles, prosecutors are bound by mandatory rules of professional
conduct that require them to "refrain from making extrajudicial comments that
have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the
accused.

67

There are times when it is entirely appropriate for law enforcement
officials to make public statements about pending or ongoing criminal
enforcement matters. For example, agency heads may inform the public about
important developments in an investigation or explain their prioritizing a certain
matter or efforts to deter repeat criminal acts. But even in these cases, an
official's message is typically carefully crafted and has undergone a thorough
review by various officials within their agency and throughout the executive
branch. 8
When the President is commenting on a criminal matter, as the chief
executive officer of the United States with an unrivaled bully pulpit, those public
comments carry even more weight. In addition to influencing potential jurors and
the public at large, such statements could affect federal law enforcements
officials' conduct. The President and other senior government officials may of
course make public statements that set national policy priorities, even when the
policy may apply to only a small group of constituents."
67

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6 (AM. BAR. Ass'N 2018).

A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation
of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know will be disseminated by means ofpublic communication
and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding in the matter.
Id.
For instance, when announcing a new batch of indictments in the Mueller investigation on
July 13, 2018, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein stated: "The special counsel's
investigation is ongoing, and there will be no comments on the special counsel at this time. ... I
want to caution you, the people who speculate about federal investigations usually do not know all
of the relevant facts. We do not try cases on television or in congressional hearings. ... We follow
the rule of law, which means that we follow procedures, and we reserve judgment. We complete
our investigations, and we evaluate all of the relevant evidence before we reach any conclusion."
Jen Kirby, Rod Rosenstein Announces Russia Indictments, Vox (Aug. 13, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/2018/7/13/17568838/mueller-rosenstein-russian-hacking-election-dnctranscript-indictment-announcement.
69
The Reagan and Obama Administrations provide useful examples. President Reagan once
stated, "The American people want the mob and its associates brought to justice and their power
broken," when he announced a comprehensive law enforcement initiative to combat organized
68
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But it does significant damage to the administration of justice when
Presidents or White House officials publicly pass judgment on individual
criminal defendants. For example, President Nixon declared that Charles
Manson "was guilty, directly or indirectly, of eight murders without reason"
before the conclusion of Manson's criminal trial.70 Amid an investigation into
Hillary Clinton's email practices during her tenure as Secretary of State,
President Obama told a Fox News host her email use had been careless but that
"I continue to believe that she has not jeopardized national security."7 1 Whether
or not that comment was accurate, or accurately reflected President Obama's
perspective, it could have downstream effects that could interfere with the
investigation.
Since assuming office, President Trump has continued his practice of
engaging in running commentary on the guilt or innocence of those under
scrutiny in high profile cases.72 On October 31, 2017, a terrorist truck attack in a
busy Manhattan pedestrian zone killed eight people and injured a dozen more.
After a confrontation, police arrested an injured Sayfullo Saipov at the scene.74

crime and its consequences, in particular drug-related crime. See President Ronald Reagan,
Remarks Announcing Federal Initiatives Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime, THE AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Oct. 14, 1982), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=43127.
Similarly, President Obama proposed a task force to investigate lenders and other business entities
involved in the financial crisis during a State of the Union speech. Barack Obama, President of the
United
States,
State
of
the
Union
Address
(Jan.
24,
2012),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-stateunion-address ("And tonight, I'm asking my Attorney General to create a special unit of federal
prosecutors and leading state attorneys general to expand our investigations into the abusive
lending and packaging of risky mortgages that led to the housing crisis.").
70
Robert B. Semple, Nixon Calls Manson Guilty, Later Withdraws Remark, N.Y.TIMEs (Aug.
4,
1970),
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/08/04/archives/nixon-calls-manson-guilty-laterwithdraws-remark-refers-to-coast.html. Faced with criticism that he had prejudged Manson's guilt.
President Nixon issued a statement that "the last thing I would do is prejudice the legal rights of
any person, in any circumstances." Id.
7t
See David S. Cloud, Obama Says Hillary Clinton Was Careless with Emails but Didn't
JeopardizeNationalSecurity, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-naobama-clinton-2016041 0-story.html.
72
As a candidate, the President referred to Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl as a "dirty rotten traitor"
and called for him to be executed by firing squad or thrown from a plane without a parachute.
During Bergdahl's sentencing before a military tribunal in November 2017, President Trump
refrained from making comments about the case but stated, "I think people have heard my
comments in the past." Meghan Keneally, President Trump Slams Bowe Bergdahl's Sentence:
"Complete Disgrace, " ABC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/presidenttrump-bowe-bergdahl/story?id=50912155.
73
Benjamin Mueller et al., TerrorAttack Kills 8 and Injures 11 in Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct.
31,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/3 1/nyregion/police-shooting-lowermanhattan.html.
74

Id.
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He was a lawful U.S. resident from Uzbekistan." Two days later, as federal,
state, and local authorities continued to investigate, President Trump tweeted:
"He killed 8 people, badly injured 12. SHOULD GET DEATH PENALTY." 76
Commentators expressed concern that the President's call for the death penalty
could potentially have the opposite effect by undermining the prosecution. 7
7. Misuse of Presidential Pardons and Classification Authority
The President could also potentially interfere with the integrity of law
enforcement by use of other authorities. Two deserve brief mention: pardons and
classification authority.
The pardon power, of course, is a broad, unilateral power granted to the
President by the Constitution." In one sense, pardons are designed to interfere in
law enforcement. They provide the President an opportunity to correct injustices,
dispense mercy, or further other national goals by means of clemency. However,
that power can take on a sinister cast if it is deployed in a self-protective interest,
either by means of an attempt to self-pardon or use of pardon power to impede
law enforcement officials from obtaining evidence in which the White House has
equities.
In the context of the Russia investigation, President Trump asserted he
has the right to pardon himself," contrary to over 40 years of executive branch

7
Corey Kilgannon & Joseph Goldstein, Sayfullo Saipov, the Suspect in the New York Terror
Attack,
and
His
Past,
N.Y.
TIMEs
(Oct.
31,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/3 1/nyregion/sayfullo-saipov-manhattan-truck-attack.html.
76
Peter Baker, Trump Declares Suspect "Should Get Death Penalty," N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/0 1/us/politics/trump-new-york-attack-schumervisa.html?_r-0.
7
See id. ("Presidents are typically advised never to weigh in on pending criminal charges
because such comments can be used by defense lawyers to argue their clients cannot get a fair trial
- especially when the head of the executive branch that will prosecute the charges advocates the
ultimate punishment before a judge has heard a single shred of evidence at trial."). The
undermining effect of overheated presidential rhetoric concern was realized in the no-jail-time
court martial sentence of Bowe Bergdahl for having been absent without leave before becoming a
Taliban prisoner. That situation is not legally identical, however, because unlawful command
influence doctrine is driven by the chain of command, and the President is the Commander in
Chief. See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 1. See also Monu Bedi, Unraveling Unlawful Command
Influence, 93 WASH. U. L. REv. 1401, 1421 (2016).
78
See U.S. CoNsT., art. II, § 2 (noting the President "sball have power to grant reprieves and
pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment").
7
See John Wagner, Trump Says He Has 'Absolute Right' to Pardon Himself of Federal
2018),
WASH.
POST
(June
4,
but
Denies
Any
Wrongdoing,
Crimes
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-says-he-has-absolute-right-to-pardon-himselfof-federal-crimes-but-denies-any-wrongdoing/2018/06/04/3d78348c-67dd- lle8-bea7c8eb28bc52blstory.html?utmterm=.eOe42a2el6e2.
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doctrine indicating a self-pardon is unconstitutional."o The pardon power casts a
shadow over cooperation agreements and plea bargaining in the criminal cases
against former Trump advisers Cohen and Manafort, although no pardons have
been issued."

National security classification authority can also have substantial
effects on ongoing criminal matters: either by classifying material that
prosecutors need for public use, or by declassifying materials that law
enforcement needs kept secret. There are instances in which it is within the
President's discretion to determine that the national security interests outweigh
criminal prosecution. Likewise, there may be situations in which the President
could determine, in good faith, that law enforcement interests should yield to
public transparency. However, classification authority could also be used to
impede investigative activity the White House deems politically threatening.
President Trump's declassification of records related to the Russia investigation,
over Department objection, became a significant controversy. 82
8.

Taking Stock of Problem Areas in Trump Administration Year
Two

In any administration, a White House will have some difficulty
navigating its relationship with Main Justice because the Department has policy,
intelligence, legal advisory, and enforcement roles. The first year of the Trump
administration has been marked by a pattern of unorthodox White House
relations with the Department that, taken together, undermine the confidence that
Department officials can discharge their investigative duties free of political
pressure. Worse, White House-Department relations have been marred by
presidential outbursts and running commentary on Department matters beyond
the President's brief. The next section places White House-Department relations
in the overall framework of statutory and constitutional law.

so

Mary C Lawton, Presidentialor Legislative Pardon of the President, in 1 SUPPLEMENTAL
OPINIONS OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 370 (Nathan A. Forrester ed., 2013).
81
See, e.g., Byron Tau, Cohen Pleaand Manafort ConvictionRaise Questions About Possible
Trump Pardon, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 21, 2018 8:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cohen-pleaand-manafort-conviction-raise-questions-about-trump-pardon-1534896170.
82
See, e.g., Jenny Herb, DisputedGOP-NunesMemo Releasedwith Trump's Approval, CNN
(Feb. 2, 2018 6:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/02/politics/republican-intelligencememo/index.html; Chris Megerian, Trump OrdersJusticeDepartmentto Declassify Some Records
Related to Adversaries in Russia Investigation, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2018 5:05 PM),
http://www.1atimes.com/politics/a-na-pol-trump-russia-declassify-20180911-story.html.
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III. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE, TAKE CARE CLAUSE & FEDERAL
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

The President serves as the chief executive of the administration. The
President's legitimacy is grounded in the constitutional method of our selection
process, especially its democratic elements. There is a constitutional premium on
preservation of the President's ability to shape the policy agenda of the executive
branch" as well as the President's ability to act as the primary voice of the United
States in foreign relations.84 By constitutional design, presidential elections
matter. The President needs to have the opportunity to deliver on those campaign
promises that can be kept or promoted within the authorities of the office. The
President also needs some baseline leverage over subordinate officials in order
to meet obligations under the Take Care Clause." But the President's
management authority over the executive branch is not a pure command-andcontrol model. The President's executive power is subject to those powers
allocated to other branches of the federal government and, in some instances, it
is shared with those branches in areas of concurrent authority." There are powers
that reside in the spheres of sovereignty retained by the states. And there are
constitutional limitations on the office itself. This section discusses how the Take
Care Clause imposes constitutional obligations that presumptively prevent the
President from engaging in political interference or controlling prosecutorial law
enforcement decisions in particular cases.
A.

The Take Care Clause

Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution requires that the
President "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."" Together, the
Executive Power Clause" and the Take Care Clause reflect "the President's
preeminent role in the execution of federal law."" The Take Care Clause charge

See infra Part III.A.6 for a discussion of unitary executive theory.
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (describing the
President as the "sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations").
8
See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,484 (2010) ("The
President cannot 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed' if he cannot oversee the
faithfulness of the officers who execute them.").
86
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.").
8
U.S. CONsT., art. II, § 3.
8
See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.").
8
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 603 (1994).
83
8
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starts with a foundational obligation to uphold the Constitution itself as the
supreme law of the land.' As such, the Clause is integral to the rule of law. The
rule of law lies at the heart of the American concept of ordered liberty. It requires
that legal rules, rather than individual officials, guide coercive government
action.9 1 In Marbury v. Madison,92 Chief Justice John Marshall reminds us that
the "government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men."" An essential feature of the rule of law is
that law constrains, and applies to, government actors. In his seminal
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer ("Steel Seizure Case")94 concurrence,
Justice Jackson conceptualizes the Take Care Clause and Due Process Clause as
two sides of the rule-of-law coin. While the Take Care Clause "gives a
governmental authority that reaches so far as there is law, the [Due Process
Clause] gives a private right that authority shall go no farther."" He concludes
that the clauses, taken together, "signify about all there is of the principle that
ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that we submit ourselves to rulers
only if under rules."" As discussed below, the Clause includes the President's
mandatory obligation ("shall") to undertake a stewardship ("take care") of the
good faith enforcement ("faithful execution") of the governing legal provisions
(the "laws"). 97 Based on its treatment by courts and the political branches, the
Clause contains multitudes.98
See also U.S. Const., art. II, § 1 (requiring the President to swear an oath to "preserve,
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States").
91
The Rule of Law is foundational to the American legal system. As defined by Bouvier:
The Rule of Law has many controversial aspects, but is core requires fair laws
that apply to all persons in a state, that are enacted for the benefit of the
citizens, and that are fairly and impartially applied without regard to the status
of the persons to whom they are applied, by officials who are themselves
bound by the laws in every aspect of their duties.
"Rule of Law," BOUVIER LAw DIcTIoNARY 1564 (2012).
92
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
90

94

Id. at 163.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, concurring).

95

Id.

9

Id.
9
Josh Blackman argues that the Clause imposes a constitutional duty on the President
consisting of "four distinct but interconnected components." Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality
of DAPA PartII: FaithfullyExecuting the Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 215, 219 (2015). I agree
with this characterization of the structural duties of the Take Care Clause. Their application does
not take me to the same conclusion as to the subject of Professor Blackman's article, President
Barack Obama's executive actions on immigration.
98
See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1835, 1838, 1867 (2016) (describing the Supreme Court's various treatments of the Take Care
Clause as both "particular and delphic" and arguing the Court treats the Clause "as a placeholder
for more abstract and generalized reasoning about the appropriate role of the President in a system
of separation of powers").
9
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The Take Care Clause as Obligation

The Take Care Clause is framed by the language of obligation rather
than power.99 That includes the mandatory language-"shall"-imposed on the
President rather than a grant of discretion to the President. 1 Cass Sunstein and
Lawrence Lessig note the placement of the Clause within section 3 of Article II
provides further evidence of its primary role as a duty rather than a grant of
power."o' The Clause's primary role as a duty does not foreclose its implication
as a recognition of presidential power, however. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
construed the Take Care Clause as both a limitation on presidential power and a
recognition of it.102
2. The Take Care Clause and Stewardship
The Take Care Clause imposes a duty of care on the President, requiring
stewardship of executive branch discretion and resources. The President acts as
a steward in the sense of "[o]ne who manages another's property, finances, or
other affairs." 03 The President, of course, acts on behalf of "We the People,"
pursuant to the Constitution. The text of the Clause also presumes a role for
subordinate officials in carrying out law enforcement. The passive construction
of the Clause contemplates that other people will carry out the administration of
the laws. 1" Thus, the President's duty of care extends to the execution of the
laws by means of the President's relation to those officials tasked with laws'

9
See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Presidentand the Adninistration,94 CoLUM.
L. REv. 1, 62 (1994) ("Unlike the other power clauses of Article II, the Take Care Clause is
expressed as a duty rather than a power.").
100
See id. (noting that the Take Care Clause, as well as the other clauses located in section 3,
are largely "expressed not as something the President may choose to do (as is the case where he
has the 'power' to undertake actions), but as something he 'shall' do").
101
Id. ("Indeed, rather than appearing in section 2 of the Article II, where the balance of the
President's basic powers are articulated, the Take Care Clause appears in section 3 of Article II, in
the context of a laundry list of other discretionary presidential duties and (arguably) powers.")
(footnotes omitted).
102
See Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 98, at 1836 ("Through a long and varied course of
interpretation . .. the Court has read that vague but modest language, in the alternative, either as a
source of vast presidential power or as a sharp limitation on the powers of both the President and
the other branches of government.").
103
Steward, WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1999).
10
See Gillian E. Metzger, The ConstitutionalDuty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 187578 (2015) (focusing on the implications of the passive voice as executive branch subordinates). In
Myers v. United States, Chief Justice Taft, drawing from his experience as a former President,
recognizes the reality that subordinates "aid [the President] in the performance of the great duties
of his office and represent him in a thousand acts to which it could hardly be supposed is personal
attention is called." 272 U.S. 52, 133 (1926). The contours of the President's management and
supervisory authority as it relates to the Take Care Clause is discussed in Part mIl.A., infra.
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administration. As discussed below, while an obligation of stewardship
contemplates some presidential power to influence subordinate administrators,
stewardship calls for different presidential orientation based on the laws at issue
and the context at hand. Sometimes care in the execution of the laws requires
heavy presidential direction, and other times it requires noninterference.
3. The Take Care Clause and Good Faith
The Take Care Clause places a duty of good faith on those bringing the
laws into execution, including the President.'o The Clause thereby informs the
attitude with which the President must consider discretion in the implementation
of laws as well as the deployment of resources designated for their execution. It
also suggests that the President's obligation of care includes an assessment of the
faithfulness of those inferior executive branch officials charged with
administration.
Zach Price argues the requirement of faithfulness in law execution
"invites inquiry into the proper scope and rigor of law enforcement that a
'faithful' executive agent should perform."' Faithfulness also invites inquiry
into which executive actors should properly participate, and what motivations
are permissible, in the exercise of levers of control. That dynamic comes into
stark relief with respect to the prosecution function. While the President often
has discretion in the means, timing, and resources devoted to execution of the
laws, that discretion is largely defined by the terms of the law as drafted by
Congress. 0 7
4.

The Take Care Clause and Legislative Supremacy

The President's Take Care Clause obligation largely turns on the nature
of the "law" at issue. In other words, the President's duties under the Take Care
Clause are defined by the valid statutes, regulations, and judicial orders about
which he must oversee execution. In this sense, the text affirms Congress's
8
legislative supremacy.o

See David E. Pozen, ConstitutionalBad Faith, 129 HARv. L. REv. 886, 907 (2016) ("It is
straightforward to construe this language as imposing a duty of good faith on the President in her
capacity as law implementer.").
106
Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion andExecutive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REv. 671, 675
(2014).
107
Of course, the Constitution provides the President with a significant role in the legislative
process, both as a matter of the formal power to veto bills and, more importantly, the leverage the
veto power provides the President to shape legislative choices during the legislative process.
1os
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) ("In the framework
of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the
idea that he is to be a lawmaker."); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go
105
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A corollary observation is that varied laws require varied execution
obligations. For example, consider a law delegating authority to the President to
declare a weapons embargo if certain statutorily defined conditions are met.
Faithful execution of that law presumes executive discretion and presidential
involvement. With respect to criminal prosecutions, the calculus changes
dramatically. There is a reasonable policy role for presidential involvement in
prioritizing categories of criminal law enforcement as a matter of public
policy.10 9 In contrast, a particular criminal prosecution calls for evenhanded
assessments of facts and law by prosecutors and law enforcement rather than
presidential factual and policy determinations.
5. The Take Care Clause as Presidential Power Preservative
Notwithstanding its language of duty, the Take Care Clause is also
preservative of presidential power. It describes a role expressly granted to the
President. In that sense, the canon of construction expressio unius est exclusion
alteriusiooperates to protect the Executive from undue external meddling. Thus,
in its standing doctrine jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has relied on the Take
Care Clause to limit judicial encroachment on the President's law execution
function."II
beyond the laws or require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power.");
see also Goldsmith & Manning, supranote 98, at 1839 (observing the Supreme Court "has treated
the Take Care Clause as the direct constitutional source of the President's obligation to respect
legislative supremacy); Price, supra note 106, at 698 (construing the original-era meaning of
"faithfully" as a method of reinforcing congressional primacy in establishing law). As discussed
in Part III.A.6, infra, Lessig and Sunstein argue that the Framers-evidenced by the Take Care
Clause drafting process as well as the Necessary and Proper Clause--contemplated an even more
significant role for Congress in administrative management of the Executive Branch.
109

See ELLIOT RICHARDSON, THE CREATIVE BALANCE: GOvERNMENT, POLITICS, AND THE

INDIVIDUAL IN AMERICA'S THIRD CENTURY 27 (1976) (noting the distinction between the "proper
role of the political process in the shaping of legal policies and the perversion of the legal process
by political pressure"). For example, President Barack Obama called for the Department of Justice
to create a special unit to investigate potential violations of criminal law after mortgage practices
created the conditions leading to the Great Recession. See also President Barack Obama, State of
the Union Address (Jan. 24, 2012) ("And tonight, I'm asking my Attorney General to create a
special unit of federal prosecutors and leading state attorneys general to expand our investigations
into the abusive lending and packaging of risky mortgages that led to the housing crisis."). At the
time, I served as Associate Counsel to the President at the White House and witnessed that speech
from the floor of the House of Representatives.
110
Expressio Unius est Exclusion Alterius, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY (defining as the
explicit mention of one [thing] is the exclusion of another).
"I
See Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 98, at 1837 (observing that the Court "has used the
Take Care Clause to define the limits of Article 11I standing" in a manner designed to "help ensure
that the President rather than the federal judiciary retains primary responsibility for the legality of
executive decisions"). See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (holding that
Congress may not create a private right of action for undifferentiated public interest in executive
compliance because it would "allow Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief
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The Take Care Clause and Executive Branch Management

Notwithstanding the Take Care Clause's role in protecting the Executive
Branch from interference in core executive functions, Congress can largely
define the scope of the President's executive branch management authority by
the terms of its legislation. A robust congressional role in defining the actors and
methods by which the executive branch carries a law into execution is anathema
to proponents of unitary executive theory.11 2
Unitary executive theorists believe the Constitution places the President
in direct, hierarchical control over a unified executive branch. They generally
subscribe to one or more of the following three presidential levers of power as
constitutionally required: substitution, nullification, and removal."1 3 The first,
and most aggressive, view is that the President may just substitute his judgment
and action for any inferior executive branch official notwithstanding a statutory
designation of that official as the sole decisionmaker.11 4 A second unitarian
model envisions a presidential power to nullify a subordinate's act even though
the President lacks direct authority to act."' Others subscribe to a third
perspective focused on removal power as a lever of control, contending "the
President has unlimited power to remove at will any principal officers (and
perhaps certain inferior officers) who exercise executive power.""'
I generally subscribe to the third view as to presidential removal power,
with the substantial caveat that the Take Care Clause operates as an independent
variable on removal power. The President may have the raw power to fire an

&

Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed"'); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) (rejecting the standing of a parental lawsuit
against the Internal Revenue Service for failure to enforce federal law prohibiting nonprofit, tax
exempt private schools from discriminating on the bases of race in part because the "Constitution,
after all, assigns to the Executive Branch, and not the Judicial Branch, the duty to 'take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed').
112
For a fulsome explanation of the theory, see generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI
CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY ExEcuTIvE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO
BUSH (2008). Some Supreme Court opinions incorporate unitary executive theory. For example, in

Printzv. UnitedStates, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), the Court struck down Brady Act provisions requiring
state and local law enforcement officers to perform federal background checks. Justice Scalia
wrote: "The insistence of the Framers upon unity in the Federal Executive-to insure both vigor
and accountability-is well known." Id. at 922. The Court was concerned that executive "unity
would be shattered" if Congress could bypass the President through commands to state officials.
Id. at 923.
113
See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 1166 (1992) (addressing these "three
mechanisms, none mentioned in Article H, by which the President might exercise his constitutional
control of the executive department").
114
See id. (citing Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A FormalistPerspective on Why the
Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 316, 347, 353 (1989)).
us5
See id.
116

Id.
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official, but that removal could nevertheless violate the Take Care Clause.1 17 The
Take Care Clause analysis would turn on the removed official's role as Congress
assigned, the nature of the government functions at issue, and the President's
reasons for efforts to exert control by means of removal power.
Consider four hypothetical scenarios in which the President removes the
Director of the U.S. Secret Service:
Scenario 1: The President removes the Director in the wake of a
security incident involving a threat to the First Family. The
President makes his decision in light of his personal experience
with the incident and an after-action investigation by the
relevant inspector general'1I finds a series of protective detail
security lapses attributable to leadership inattention.
Scenario 2: The President removes the Director after the
Director demonstrates sustained resistance to a congressional
proposal, backed by the White House, to increase the Secret
Service's role in cybersecurity of U.S. financial institutions. The
Director does not want to distract the Service from its traditional
twin core investigation functions: threats to protectees and paper
money counterfeiting operations. The President wants a Director
who will fully embrace the contemplated cyber mission.
Scenario 3: The President commands the Director's resignation
because violent demonstrators breach a foreign embassy
compound in Washington, D.C. By treaty and domestic law, the
Uniformed Division of the Secret Service had responsibility for
foreign embassy security. A subsequent inspector general
investigation does not find fault with the Secret Service because
the demonstration was spontaneous and beyond the ability of its
senior leaders to foresee. Nevertheless, the President demands
the resignation of the Director in order to help quell the foreign
government's outrage and repair diplomatic relations.
117
The law of jury nullification provides a suitable analogy. Under prevailing law, a jury has
the raw power, but not the legal right, to acquit a criminal defendant for reasons beyond the
constraints of the trial judge's charge to jurors regarding applicable law. See, e.g., State v. Ragland,
519 A.2d 1361, 1369, 1371 (1986) (recognizing the jury "has the power to nullify the law by
acquitting those believed by the jury to be guilty[,]" but characterizing it as "absolutely inconsistent
with the most fundamental value of Western democracy, that we should live under a government
of laws and not of men"). While the President enjoys power to remove senior officials, the
constitutionality of the act of removal must further be evaluated against Take Care obligations.
us
The Office of Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has audit and
accountability jurisdiction over the Secret Service. See About Us, OFF. INSPECTOR GEN.,
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/about (last visited Oct. 5, 2018).
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Scenario 4: The President fires the Director because a
counterfeiting investigation has started to focus on major donors
to the President's campaign and political party. Allegations have
surfaced that some of the contributions made to those political
committees, as well as some of the cash expenditures listed on
Federal Election Committee filings, reflect counterfeit currency.
In all four scenarios, the President has the clear power to remove the
Director at will. A unitary executive purist would end the analysis at that point,
suggesting that any other limitation on the President's removal power would
unconstitutionally circumvent the Vesting Clause and sap the President's ability
to meet his Take Care Clause obligations. The better reading of the Take Care
Clause, however, untethers the President's right to remove from the power to do
so.
In Scenario 1, the President's removal of the Director promotes his duty
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Under the relevant law,
presidential protection is a core Secret Service mission. If the President has lost
confidence in its leadership to carry out that mission, removal of the Director
furthers the execution of that mission. Nothing on these facts suggests that a
successor would undermine the faithful execution of the Secret Service mission.
Scenario 2 represents a good faith policy disagreement between the
Director and the President as to the scope of the Secret Service mission. Unlike
the Director, the President's perspective has constitutional significance. He not
only has a Take Care Clause obligation, but also has a significant constitutional
role in the federal legislative process.' 19 In addition, unlike the Director, the
President occupies an office with a scope that looks across executive branch
agencies. Interagency coordination is one of the primary functions of the White
House policy and national security processes. Congress and the President decide
how to structure the executive branch departments. Thus, the President's removal
of a law enforcement official over a policy disagreement in which the President's
role is supreme does not offend the Take Care Clause. Furthermore, like Scenario
1, there is nothing to suggest that the President will choose a subsequent
appointee who would undermine faithful law enforcement.
Scenario 3 complicates the picture because of the blamelessness of the
Service. It presents the Director's continued government service in tension with

119
The President's veto power and the Recommendations Clause recognize the President's
agency in the legislative process notwithstanding the legislative power granted to Congress. See
U.S. CONST., art. I, §1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States . . . . ");Id. art. I § 7 (providing for the President's power to return bills, i.e., the veto
power); and Id. art. II, § 3 ("[The President] shall from time to time . .. recommend to [Congress's]
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. . . .").
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the President's constitutional role as the "sole organ" of U.S. diplomacy.' 20
Again, like Scenario 2, the President's portfolio of constitutional roles requires
that he have discretion, in the first instance, to deploy removal power in order to
deconflict them when they are in tension with one another. And, again, there is
nothing to suggest the next Director will do anything but advance the agency's
law enforcement mission in good faith.
However, the President's conduct in Scenario 4 violates his obligations
under the Take Care Clause. Now, the President is using the power of removal
to thwart a law enforcement investigation in bad faith. Further, unlike the first
three scenarios, one would expect that the next Director will have received the
message from the Oval Office loud and clear: do not pursue investigations if they
lead to the President's political allies.
My departure from unitarian orthodoxy as to removal power turns on a
different understanding of the Take Care Clause in the constitutional scheme,
especially as it relates to the Vesting Clause. From the unitary executive
perspective, a congressional enactment limiting the President's management
control of the prosecution function could frustrate Take Care Clause obligations.
The President would be restricted in an ability to ensure that the law is being
faithfully executed by subordinates beyond his functional control. This is the
position Scalia took in his Morrison v. Olsonl2 ' dissent. From the other
perspective, however, the Take Care obligations are defined by the particular
congressional enactments at issue. Some laws require a pure line of presidential
authority to provide for their faithful execution. Others, including the
prosecutorial function, in contrast, call for faithfulness of a different variety:
circumscribed presidential involvement or political interference. Thus, the
majority in Morrison holds that good cause restrictions on removal of an
independent counsel do not "impermissibly burden" the President's
constitutional authority.' 22
One of Sunstein and Lessig's keen insights is the Framers' enhancement
of the congressional role in shaping the President's Take Care obligations. At the
Constitutional Convention, the Framers removed language granting power to the
President to "carry into execution" the laws and replaced it with the duty to take
care that those laws be faithfully executed.' 2 3 At the same time, Article I granted
Congress the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for

120
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (describing the "very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government
in the field of international relations"); see also Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2079 (2015)
(describing the President's capacity to engage in "delicate and often secret diplomatic contacts").
121
487 U.S. 654, 726 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If the removal of a prosecutor, the virtual
embodiment of the power to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed,' can be restricted, what
officer's removal cannot?").
122
Id. at 692.
123
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 99, at 66.
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carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof."1 24 By means of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress
is charged with a significant role in defining the terms of laws being carried into
execution. Congress has a prime seat at the table in defining the President's Take
Care obligations as hands on or hands off.
B. The Take Care Clause and the ProsecutorialFunction
In the context of the Department's criminal enforcement functions, then,
we must look to the legislation authorizing federal criminal proceedings in order
to understand the President's Take Care obligations. 12 5 This Section assesses the
foundational laws of the Department's enforcement functions that define the
President's corresponding Take Care Clause obligations. This analysis addresses
the text, operation, and legislative intent of these legal authorities.
1. Federal Prosecutors
Congress assigned the prosecution function to the Attorney General and
United States Attorneys by means of statute.' 26 The Judiciary Act of 1789
established the office of the Attorney General, charging the President to appoint
"a meet person, learned in the law to act as attorney general for the United
States." 2 7 The Supreme Court later described the Attorney General as "the hand
of the President in taking care that the laws of the United States ... in the
prosecution of offences, be faithfully executed." 28 The office went through a
gradual, and uneven, path to its current status as chief law enforcement officer.1 29
However, Congress subsequently specified that "the conduct of litigation in
which the United States ... is a party. . . is reserved to officers of the Department

I, § 8, cl. 18 (the Necessary and Proper Clause).
Here, I do not mean the substantive criminal statutes, but rather the function of criminal
prosecution and the legal authorities establishing the Department and the FBI that empower federal
employees to investigate and prosecute crimes on behalf of the United States.
126
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (characterizing the Attorney
General and United States Attorneys as "designatedby statute as the President's delegates to help
him discharge his constitutional responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed')
(quoting U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 3) (emphasis added).
127
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 35, 1 Stat. 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 503 (2018)
("The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, an Attorney
General of the United States.")).
128
Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922).
129
For a fulsome account of the history of the Attorney General's role, see Griffin B. Bell, The
Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and ChiefLitigator, or One Among
Many?, 46 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1049, 1050-57 (1978).
124

U.S. CONST. art.

125
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of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General." 1 30 The first Congress
also created the position of United States attorney in each judicial district with
authority to prosecute federal crimes.'
In 1870, Congress created the Department of Justice,'32 to be led by the
Attorney General. The modern statute declares: "The Department of Justice is an
executive department of the United States at the seat of Government." 3 3 The
1870 Act set out the duties of the Attorney General and subordinate attorneys
and investigators:

.

[T]he officers of the law department, under the direction of the
Attorney-General, shall give all opinions and render all services
requiring the skills of persons learned in the law, necessary to
enable the President and heads of the executive Departments .
. to discharge their respective duties; and shall, for and on behalf
of the United States, procure the proper evidence for, and
conduct, prosecute, or defend all suits and proceedings in the
Supreme Court of the United States and in the court of
claims .... 134

It also shifted supervisory power from the Secretary of the Interior over district
attorneys and others to the Attorney General, and established that "the AttorneyGeneral shall have supervision of the conduct and proceedings of the various
3 Today, the
attorneys for the United States in the respective judicial districts.""'
"[plrosecution of all criminal violations is controlled by the Department of
Justice."' 6
2. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte issued a memorandum in 1908
describing a "force of special agents" from which the modern FBI traces its

130
28 U.S.C. § 516 (2018); see also White House Communications with the DOJ and FBI,
United to Protect Democracy (Mar. 8, 2017), https://protectdemocracy.org/agencycontacts
(asserting a White House effort to "direct the use of law enforcement to investigate or prosecute
an individual matter" might violate Section 516).
131
§ 35, 1. Stat. at 93.
132
Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150 § 14, 16 Stat. 162.
133
28 U.S.C. § 501 (2018).
134

13
136

§ 14, 16 Stat. at 164.
Id. at § 16, 16 Stat. 162, 164.
Bell, supranote 129, at 1057.
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origins.137 In 1976, Congress limited the FBI Director to one 10-year term. 38 The
Senate Judiciary Committee report on the proposal announced twin
"complementary objectives" to the legislation: "The first is to insulate the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from undue pressure being
exerted upon him from superiors in the Executive Branch. The second is to
protect against an FBI Director becoming too independent and unresponsive." 3 9
Of particular note, the Committee observes: "The position is not an ordinary
Cabinet appointment which is usually considered a politically oriented member
of the President's 'team."'l4 0 Thus, Congress signals to the President its
expectations with respect to limitations on the President's supervision of the FBI
Director as a function of removal power.
3.

The Prosecutorial Function

The FBI serves as the chief federal investigative agency and the U.S.
Attorneys and other designated Department lawyers serve as the exclusive
prosecutors of federal criminal law. There is a longstanding debate as to whether
federal criminal prosecutions constitute a core executive function. That dispute,
in turn, often serves as proxy for unitary versus regulable executive. This struggle
has particular sensitivity in the context of criminal investigations. In Morrison,
the Supreme Court characterized prosecution as an executive function, albeit one
that left room for congressional regulation of the degree of the Executive's
control. Six years later, however, in United States v. Armstrong,141 the Court
described criminal prosecution as a core executive function.1 4 2 From a pure
unitary executive perspective, the "President can be considered, in a sense, the
'3
OFF. ATr'Y GEN., ORDER ESTABLISHING FBI (July 26, 1908). Bonaparte undertook this effort
in response to a congressional provision that foreclosed the Department's prior practice of
barrowing the services of Secret Service agents who were employees of the Department of
Treasury. A year later, Bonaparte's successor George W. Wickersham named this force the
"Bureau of Investigation." During World War I, Congress started assigning counter-espionage
assignments to the Bureau of Investigation.
13
See Crime Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-503, §203; 90 Stat. 2407, 2427 (1976)
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 532 to establish a single, ten-year term for the FBI Director). In 1968,
Congress elevated the FBI Director role from a Department bureau chief hired by the Attorney
General to a presidential appointee subject to Senate confirmation. See also Omnibus Crime
Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, Title VI, § 1101, 82 Stat. 192, 236 (1968).
In so doing, "Congress asserted its obligation to evaluate the qualifications" of the FBI Director
given the "vital importance of the office . . for the administration of. . .justice." S. REP. NO. 931213, at 2 (1974).
"3
S. JuD. COMM. No. 92-1213, at 1 (1974).
140
Id. at 3.
141
517 U.S. 456 (1996).
142
See id. (describing criminal prosecutions as "a core executive constitutional function"). In
Armstrong, the Court relied on its core executive function determination in overturning a discovery
order that sought prosecutorial files related to charging discretion. Id.
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chief prosecutor of the United States in that he has access to or influence over all
federal investigations unless he decrees otherwise . . . ."143 Others argue
prosecution is not a core executive function beyond Congress's power to limit
the President's supervisory role.1" But the Take Care Clause operates on
presidential conduct with respect to the prosecutorial function whether or not it
is core or ancillary to the Executive, and regardless of whether the President has
the raw power to remove subordinate officials.
4.

Prosecutorial Integrity and Non-Interference

The Department's Great Hall features the statue The Spirit of Justice,
which is a rendering of Lady Justice, the symbolic personification of a legal
system grounded in the rule of law. Lady Justice is often depicted with a
blindfold, a balance, and a sword1 4 5 that together symbolize the evenhanded
administration and moral force of law. Fidelity to the rule of law requires that
prosecutors evaluate facts and evidence without interference by political figures.
Elena Kagan argues for the President's robust executive management role over
the administrative apparatus in her seminal article Presidential
Administration.14 6 However, she draws the line of Presidential authority to direct
subordinate executive branch officials when it comes to criminal prosecutions. 14 7
She reasons:
Resolution of prosecutorial questions usually is conceived as
lying at the heart of the executive power vested in the President.
But it is in this area, because so focused on particular individuals
and firms, that the crassest forms of politics (involving, at the
extreme, personal favors and vendettas) pose the greatest danger
of displacing professionalism and thereby undermining
confidence in legal decisionmaking.148

143
Luke M. Milligan, The "Ongoing CriminalInvestigation" Constraint:Getting Away with
Silence, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 747, 756 n.43 (2008). See also Saikrishna Prakash, The
ChiefProsecutor,73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 (2005).
'"
See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, A Symposium on Morrison v. Olson: Addressing the
Constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Statute: Executive Control Over Criminal Law
Enforcement: Some Lessons From History, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 275,278 (1989) (arguing that, "from
a historical perspective, criminal law enforcement cannot be considered a core or exclusive power
of the executive branch").
145
The Spirit of Justice at the Department does not present Lady Justice with those
accoutrements.
1" See Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245 (2001).
147
Id. at 2357 (describing "appropriate boundaries on presidential direction" as a prohibition
on presidential involvement "when, but only when, the government exercises prosecutorial
authority").
148
Id. at 2357-58.
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Kagan's view is emblematic of the widespread understanding of the need for
insulation from political or personal interests in criminal prosecutions.
Prosecutorial independence from political interference is even a criterion used
by the State Department to evaluate other countries' human rights practices.149
5. The Dual Function Paradox: Advisor & Independent Actor
The varied roles and missions of the Department create a paradox for its
senior leadership. The paradox is woven into these incompatible statutory
functions: numerous Department officers must serve as legal or intelligence
advisors to the President in the fulfillment of his duties but they must also
investigate and prosecute crimes. The Attorney General serves as both a legal
advisor to the President and chief law enforcement officer with supervisory
responsibility for criminal investigations and prosecutions. 150 As Attorney
General Bell noted: "From the inception of the office of the Attorney General in
the Judiciary Act of 1789, there has been ambiguity about the role, and
disagreement about the independence, of the Attorney General."'' A proper
understanding of the President's Take Care Clause obligations is necessary for
the Attorney General to be able to navigate a role requiring "varying degrees of
contact and coordination with the executive branch on one hand, and
independence from the executive branch on the other.""'
C. A Take Care Clause Hardship:CriminalInvestigations of White House
Actors
These awkward White House-Department dynamics, and the stakes,
only intensify when the President, his staff, or his associates are the subject of a
criminal investigation."' The President's Take Care Clause noninterference
obligations, too, become particularly acute when a federal criminal investigation

149
See U.S DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTs ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2017,
available at https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2017/.
150
See NANcY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIEs 2-4 (1992) (surveying various ways
Attorneys General have managed their conflicting roles); see also Bell, supra note 129, at 1064
(discussing the "struggle for political independence" in the rendering of legal advice to the
President); id. at 1067 (noting the "difficulty regarding independence is due in part to the
multifaceted nature of the Attorney General's job").
151
Bell, supra note 129, at 1065 (footnotes omitted).
152
Id. at 1067.
153
While this article focuses on limitations on White House contacts with the Department,
conflict-of-interest rules are strongly implicated when White House equities are at issue in a
Department investigation. The Ford White House defined conflicts: "A conflict of interest may
exist whenever a member of the staff has a personal or private interest in a matter which is related
to his official duties and responsibilities or the activities of the staff" See Standards of Conduct
for the White House Staff, $2 (Oct. 28, 1974) [hereinafter Ford White House Standards].
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involves White House actors. In the wake of Watergate, one commentator noted,
the "partisan instincts of the executive collide most noticeably with the
supposedly nonpartisan nature of law enforcement when the executive branch
investigates itself and prosecutes crimes of government officials.""' Whether a
President may be indicted remains an unresolved and contested constitutional
question."' However, the Office of Legal Counsel has determined that "all
federal civil officers except the President are subject to indictment and criminal
prosecution while still in office.""' Therefore, the Vice President and all White
House staff are amenable to criminal prosecution. 5 7 Further, the Constitution
explicitly contemplates the possibility of criminal prosecution of a President
removed following impeachment."'
Enforcing criminal law where there are White House equities presents
vexing problems for the Executive. The President is not a king and is subject to
law like everyone else. However, the law must also take into account the
President's singular role and critical constitutional duties. Moreover, there are
legitimate concerns about the democratic accountability of the law enforcement.
Post-Watergate, Congress and the Executive Branch have struggled to establish
structures and processes adequate to balance these competing values.
As a result of President Nixon's firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald
Cox during the Saturday Night Massacre and other Watergate abuses, Congress
enacted reforms including the establishment of the independent counsel.'5I As
discussed earlier, its constitutionality was upheld in Morrison over Justice

Frank M. Tuerkheimer, The Executive Investigates Itself, 65 CALF. L. REv. 597, 597 (1977).
1s
Compare Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Janet Reno, Attorney Gen. (Oct. 16, 2000) (concluding that
criminal indictment while in office would impermissibly hobble the President's "ability to carry
out his constitutionally assigned functions" which "would be inconsistent with the constitutional
structure"), with Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (containing indications from four
dissenting justices and one concurring opinion that a sitting President is subject to criminal
indictment). See also Ryan Goodman, When Five Supreme Court Justices Said a President Can
Be Indicted, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 17, 2017), https://wwwjustsecurity.org/44264/supreme-courtjustices-president-indicted/.
156
Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Janet Reno, Attorney Gen. (Oct. 16, 2000) (characterizing, with approval,
the determination by OLC in Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, Amenability of the President, Vice President, and Other Civil Officers to
Federal Criminal Prosecution While in Office (Sept. 24, 1973)).
1
See Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, Amenability of the President, Vice President, and Other Civil Officers to Federal
Criminal Prosecution While in Office (Sept. 24, 1973).
1s
See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (providing that government officials, including the
President, convicted in impeachment proceedings "shall nevertheless be liable ... to Indictment,
Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law"),
159
See Ethics in Government Act, Title VI, Pub. L. No. 951-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867 (1978)
(establishing the authorities for the independent counsel).
15
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Antonin Scalia's vigorous dissent.' That statute was used in a number of highprofile investigations of senior political figures such as the Iran-Contra scandal"6
and, most famously, the Whitewater investigation that eventually led to President
Bill Clinton's impeachment. 62 It expired in 1999.163 In its place, the Department
of Justice established regulations providing for the appointment of a special
counsel." Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed Robert Mueller
Special Counsel in the Russia investigation pursuant to these regulations.
The White House, therefore, will have occasion to respond to requests
for cooperation in criminal investigations.' One of the main roles of the Office
of White House Counsel is managing responses to document requests and
subpoenas.' 6 6 Congressional investigating committees and civil litigants fairly

See supra Section m.A.6.
See Kenneth W. Starr, Ronald Reagan, in KEN GORMLEY ED., THE PRESIDENTS AND THE
CONSTrruTION: A LIvING HISTORY 547 (2016).
162
That investigation had morphed from investigation of the Clintons' role in a failed land deal
in Arkansas to lying in a civil deposition related to Paula Jones's sexual harassment lawsuit. While
the goal of independence had been achieved, insulation from politics had failed. After the political
convulsions caused by the Whitewater investigation, Congress had little appetite to renew the
independent counsel statute.
163
Ken Gormley, William Jefferson Clinton, in KEN GORMLEY ED., THE PRESIDENTS AND THE
160
161

CONsTiTuTION: A LIvING HISTORY 580 (2016).

16
See 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1--600.6 (2018) (setting out the Special Counsel authorities); see also
Neal Katyal, Trump or Congress Can Still Block Robert Mueller. Iknow. I Wrote the Rules., WASH.
POST (May 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/05/19/politicscould-still-block-muellers-investigation-i-know-i-wrote-the-rules/utm term=.7dcaebdccc25.
165
See Letter from Keith B. Nelson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legislative Affairs, to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H.R. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform
at 2 (June 24, 2008) (noting that there "is an admirable tradition, extending back through
Administrations of both political parties, of full cooperation by the White House with criminal
investigations"). That letter relates to the criminal investigation conducted by the Office of Special
Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald into the disclosure of Valerie Plame Wilson's identity as a Central
Intelligence Agency officer, which focused attention on a variety of people in the George W. Bush
White House. Later, President Bush asserted executive privilege over records of interviews by the
President and Vice President conducted by Special Counsel Fitzgerald. See also Michael Isikoff,
Plame Probe Stymied by Bush Privilege Claim, NEWSWEEK (July 15, 2008). Attorney General
Mukasey recommended that President Bush assert executive privilege in part because compliance
with the subpoena might "discourage voluntary cooperation with future Department criminal
investigations involving official White House actions." Memorandum from Michael Mukasey,
Attorney Gen., to President George W. Bush, Assertion of Executive Privilege Concerning the
Special Counsel's Interviews of the Vice Presidentand Senior White House Staff at 11 (July 15,
2008). Mukasey warned that future White House actors "might insist . .. on disclosing information
only pursuant to a grand jury subpoena in order to ensure the secrecy protections of Rule 6(e) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." Id
166
See MaryAnne Borrelli et al., The White House Counsel's Office, 31 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
Q. 561, 570 (2001) (noting White House counsel's "role in responding to document requests and
subpoenas directed to members of the White House staff and other executive branch officials").
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regularly seek records and testimony from the White House. Subpoenas and civil
discovery requests from non-executive branch actors may raise issues of
separation of powers, federalism, and immunity. However, federal criminal
investigations of White House conduct create intra-executive dynamics that
further complicate White House-Department relations.'
With respect to the Take Care Clause, however, the President's
obligations are fairly clear. The President and his staff should treat any criminal
investigation touching on White House equities at arms' length. First and
foremost, White House lawyers should keep fidelity to their public service
obligations' 8 and continue to facilitate the President's performance of his duties.
They should otherwise manage interactions with the criminal investigators and
prosecutors in generally the same way a general counsel of a corporation might:
responding to document requests and subpoenas, coordinating logistics with
counsel for privately represented parties, addressing practical concerns, and
raising good faith legal objections. Even in this context, the President is entitled
to some leeway in how to navigate his Take Care Clause obligations. However,
presidential obstruction of a federal criminal investigation of White House actors
is antithetical to the Take Care Clause.
IV. TAKE CARE CLAUSE ENFORCEMENT OF NON-INTERFERENCE
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

All three branches have roles in the enforcement of the President's Take
Care Clause obligations not to interfere improperly in federal criminal
prosecutions. The Take Care Clause is enforced by a complex set of formal and
informal methods: executive self-regulation, inter-branch signaling, legislative
leverage, statutory restrictions, grand jury investigations, and the ever-present,
though remote, twin threats of impeachment and judicial enforcement.
A number of presidential administrations brought significant improper
political pressure to bear on criminal prosecutions. President Thomas Jefferson

Subpoena and document request response has been my primary official responsibility as a White
House lawyer for Vice President Al Gore and President Barack Obama.
167
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), superseded by statute, Fed. R. Evid.
104(a), as recognizedin Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 177 (1987) (rejecting President
Nixon's challenge to the justiciability of enforcement of the Special Prosecutor's grand jury
subpoena in an "intra-branch" dispute).
168
See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
The public interest in honest government and in exposing wrongdoing by
government officials, as well as the tradition and practice, acknowledged by
the Office of the President and by former White House Counsel, of government
lawyers reporting evidence of federal criminal offenses whenever such
evidence comes to them, lead to the conclusion that a government attorney
may not invoke the attorney-client privilege in response to grand jury questions
seeking information relating to the possible commission of a federal crime. Id.
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orchestrated Aaron Burr's trial for treason.'"9 In the Watergate cover-up,
President Richard Nixon sought to thwart the Special Prosecutor's office by
means of personnel decisions, appeals to intelligence agency officials to
intervene, and surveillance of the Department's investigative activity.1 70 With the
benefit of that hindsight, it is difficult to imagine President John F. Kennedy
appointing his brother, Robert F. Kennedy as Attorney General, much less the
Senate confirming him."'
Watergate, and the Nixon administration's broader misuse of law
enforcement and intelligence agencies,' 7 2 prompted a severe political and
President Jefferson's orchestration of Burr's treason trial represents an ugly episode of
presidential political manipulation of the federal criminal prosecution. Senator Mike Lee (R-Utah)
describes President Jefferson's "long-standing personal and political vendetta against his rival,
Aaron Burr-a man who served as Jefferson's vice president and whom Jefferson single-handedly
tried to convict of treason, a capital offense." MIKE LEE, WRITTEN OUT OF HISTORY: THE
FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS WHO FOUGHT BIG GOVERNMENT 2-3 (2017). General James Wilkinson,
commander of the Army of the United States, provided Jefferson with decoded translation of an
encrypted letter with the claim it had been written by Burr. See id at 13-14. While Burr's
authorship is questionable, to Jefferson it confirmed his worst suspicions that Burr was preparing
to stage a coup. See id. at 14.
169

Before America's first trial of the century, Jefferson campaigned to convince the public that Burr
was a traitor. Id. at 3 ("Even before the trial began, Jefferson would expend relentless efforts to
convict Burr in the court of public opinion . . . ."). He transmitted a message to Congress accusing
Burr of conspiracy to consisting of "an illegal combination of private individuals against the peace
and safety of the Union, and a military expedition planned by them against the territories of a power
in amity with the United States." Thomas Jefferson, Message to Congress on the Burr Conspiracy,
THE
AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT
(Jan.
22,
1807)
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/?pid=65721
[hereinafter Burr Conspiracy Message].
Jefferson framed his presentation as the president's response to a grave national security threat,
which is within the expected role of the commander-in-chief. While Jefferson acknowledged doubt
in the quality of the incriminating evidence, he asserted Burr's "guilt is placed beyond question."
See Burr ConspiracyMessage ("It is chiefly in the form of letters, often containing such a mixture
of rumors, conjectures, and suspicions as renders it difficult to sift out the real facts and unadvisable
to hazard more than general outlines, strengthened by concurrent information or the particular
credibility of the relator."). See also LEE, supra, at 14 (describing these qualifications as a "note of
judiciousness" on Jefferson's part). Chief Justice John Marshall gaveled the trial to order in
Richmond, Virginia on May 22, 1807 and Burr was ultimately acquitted in September of that year.

See JOSEPH WHEELEN, JEFFERSON'S VENDETTA:

THE PURSUIT OF AARON BURR AND THE JUDICIARY

(2004).
170
For example, acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray sent surreptitious periodic reports on the
Watergate investigation to President Nixon's top White House aides, White House Chief of Staff
John Ehrlichman and White House Counsel John Dean. See JAWORSKI, supranote 48, at 115.
171
But see WHITNEY N. SEYMOUR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 39 (1975) ("When 'Bobby'
Kennedy was appointed Attorney General by his brother, President John F. Kennedy, there was a
brief public outcry against nepotism. But Robert F. Kennedy quickly demonstrated his talents and
tackled the assignment with remarkable energy and dedication.").
172
Of course, it was President Nixon's participation in the Watergate cover-up that sealed the
demise of his presidency, but Nixon Administration politicization of the Justice Department was
far broader. President Nixon's Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst told a gathering of
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regulatory backlash. Attorney General Bell lamented that the "partisan activities
of some Attorneys General in this century, combined with the unfortunate legacy
of Watergate, have given rise to an understandable public concern that some
decisions at Justice may be the products of favor, or pressure, or politics."'73 This
section addresses these various enforcement mechanisms of the post-Watergate
era. The common thread, however, is not that these enforcement mechanisms are
mere norms, but rather prophylaxes to prevent the President from abusing power
in a manner that violates the Take Care Clause.
A.

The Executive Branch

The first line of defense against presidential overreach is executive selfregulation. The President must submit to the obligations of the Take Care Clause
and the Oath of Office. There are external checks, to be sure, including
interbranch competition, checks and balances, and the limits of popular opinion.
But a healthy system of self-government relies on the President governing
himself. Given the singularity of the office, an ungoverned executive threatens
to undermine external limits. As Justice Jackson, himself a former Attorney
General, forcefully observed: "By his prestige as head of state and his influence
upon public opinion he exerts a leverage upon those who are supposed to check
and balance his power which often cancels their effectiveness."1 7 4
Like the President, inferior executive branch officials, too, operate under
an obligation of faithful execution of the laws. They, too, have legal obligations
to insulate some particular functions from undue interference from senior

.

United States attorneys "it is of the utmost importance to keep this Administration in power. .
and you men must do everything you can to insure that result." Id. Attendees characterized Nixon's
reelection as an imperative repeated by Kleindienst to United States attorneys over a period of
months. See id He reportedly instructed them to "avoid controversies that might lose votes." Id. at
226-27. Seymour ultimately concludes that the Nixon Administration abuses of power "have
plainly shown that strong measures are needed to insulate the enforcement of the law from political
partisanship and lawless official conduct." Id. at 227.
In another incident, John Ehrlichman told then-Assistant Attorney General Kleindienst that
President Nixon ordered the Department not appeal an antitrust case against International
Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT). See JAWORSKI, supra note 48, at 149-57. When
Kleindienst refused, Nixon called to give the order directly. An "angry" Nixon was "abusive" on
the call, threatening senior officials' jobs and concluding "This is an order!" Id. at 150. Subsequent
published reports alleged Nixon wanted the case settled because ITT promised to provide $400,000
to the 1972 Republican National Convention. See id. at 50. Sometime after his resignation due to
Watergate scandal proximity, Kleindienst was convicted of lying to Congress during his Senate
confirmation hearings when he denied having ever discussed the ITT case with the President or
White House staff. See id. at 149-57.
173
Bell Address, supra note 1, at 3.
174
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653-54 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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political leadership, including the President. Thus, intra-executive regulations
75
are the starting point of this enforcement analysis.s
1.

White House-Department Contacts Policies

Since President Richard Nixon resigned, White House staff has
generally been prohibited from contacting executive branch agencies about
investigations, enforcement actions, or adjudications.' 7 6 After assuming office,
President Gerald Ford approved "Standards of Conduct for the White House
Staff" that barred all exparte contacts with regulatory agencies and procurement
officers unless there was prior clearance by the White House Counsel's Office.177
Every administration since President Gerald Ford has undertaken formal efforts
to restrict White House contacts with agencies undertaking enforcement
78
Over that period, the White House Counsel's Office has taken the
functions.s
lead role in managing the sensitive relationship between the White House and
the Department.1 79 This includes an essential gatekeeping role for White House
contacts with the Department. Attorneys General have also undertaken the duty
to manage relations with the White House. 8 0
White House agency contacts limitations are part of the broader set of
rules and norms designed to safeguard the rule of law in the American
constitutional system. It is important, therefore, to view these policies in context
rather than in isolation. Political noninterference, independent legal judgment,
and legal process observance animate these policies. Strong White House agency

175
See Neal Kumar Katyal, InternalSeparationofPowers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006) (arguing for robust inter-executive regulations
and checks on political leadership).
176
See Memorandum from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, on Contacts with Agencies
for White House Staff 2 (January 16, 1996) [hereinafter Quinn Memorandum],
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/27001.
177
Ford White House Standards, supra note 153, at ¶ 11.
178
See generally id.; Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, White House Chief of Staff, on
Standards of Conduct: Contacts with Regulatory Agencies and Procurement Officers to All
Employees of the White House Office and the Domestic Council (Oct. 10, 1975), [hereinafter
Rumsfeld
Memorandum]
(on
file
with
author),https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0204/1511945.pdf
1
See generally MARYANNE BORRELLI ET AL., THE WHITE HOUSE TRANSITION PROJECT, THE
WITE HOUSE COUNSEL'S OFFICE (2008), http://www.whitehousetransitionproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/WHTP-2009-29-Counsel.pdf. The report identifies management of
White House and agency contacts with the Department as one of five primary functions of the
White House Counsel's Office. See id. at 6.
1so
See, e.g., Bell, supra note 129, at 1069 (noting he "played an important role as a buffer
between our truly independent litigating attorneys in the Department of Justice, including the
Solicitor General and his staff, and other government officials outside the Department of Justice").
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contacts policies are a necessary, but not sufficient, safeguard for the rule of
18
law.s

This section of the Article surveys the post-Watergate administrations'
White House contacts policies. It concludes with a holistic analysis of the
policies. While the policies vary in their scope and coverage across
administrations, there are some common features that suggest they are critical to
enforcement of the President's Take Care Clause obligations with respect to
prosecutorial integrity.
i.

The FordAdministration

Gerald Ford ascended to the Presidency from his leadership position in
the House of Representatives after the successive scandal-driven resignations of
Vice President Spiro Agnew and President Richard M. Nixon. He took as central
to his mandate the restoration of faith in the Office of the President and the
broader U.S. government. The integrity of the Department was central to his
mission. Edward H. Levi served as Attorney General in the Ford administration.
At his swearing-in ceremony, President Ford described Levi's mandate as
restoration of faith in the Department of Justice after Watergate. 182 For his part,
Levi pledged to convince a rattled citizenry, "by word and deed, that our law is
not an instrument of partisan purpose and it is not an instrument to be used in
ways which are careless of the higher values which are within all of us." 8 ' As
later recounted by Levi's special assistant, it was not clear that the crisis of
legitimacy at the Department "could be restored at all so long as the Department
remained an integral part of the executive branch.""
The Ford White House Standards declared there is "no justification for
[White House staff] involvement in adjudicative proceedings." Subsequent
guidance from Ford's. White House Chief of Staff, Donald Rumsfeld,
characterized the Standards as prohibiting "all ex parte contacts with regulatory
agencies unless there is prior clearance with the Counsel's Office."" It noted

"8
See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., on Communications with the White House
and Congress for Heads of Department Components and All United States Attorneys 1 (May 11,
2009)
[hereinafter
Holder
Memorandum],
https://www.justice.gov/oip/foialibrary/communications with thewhite houseand congress 2009.pdf/download
(indicating
the contacts policy restrictions are designed to "promote the rule of law").
182
See President Gerald Ford, Remarks at the Swearing in ofEdward H. Levi as Att'y Gen. of
the
U.S.,
1975
Pun.
PAPERS
203,
204-05
(Feb.
7,
1975)
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=5467 (describing Levi's responsibility during
this "troubled time" to make "the Department the great Department it has been and must be if all
our citizens are to have faith in the laws of our land").
183
Edward H. Levi, Remarks at His Swearing in as Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 11 WEEKLY CoMP.
PRES. Doc. 164 (Feb. 7, 1975).
184
Ronald G. Carr, Mr. Levi at Justice, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 300, 301-02 (1985).
185
Rumsfeld Memorandum, supra note 178, at 1.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2018

45

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 121, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 4

WEST VIR GINIA LAW REVIEW

398

[Vol. I121

that "the ban on contacts extends to the litigating and adjudicatory divisions of
the Department of Justice and the IRS."' These rules were designed to further
the overall Standards goals of maintaining public confidence in the integrity of
government operations, the assurance that government decisions would not be
influenced by officials' private interests, and the impartial treatment of those
dealing with the government.'"'
ii.

The CarterAdministration

'

President Jimmy Carter continued President Ford's rehabilitation
project. His first Attorney General, Griffin Bell, described a critical part of his
mandate as "trying to articulate a position for the Justice Department that will
constitute the Department into a neutral zone in the Government, because the law
has to be neutral."' He acknowledged that "the partisan activities of some
Attorneys General in this century, combined with the unfortunate legacy of
Watergate, have given rise to an understandable public concern that some
decisions at Justice may be the products of favor, or pressure, or politics."
According to White House Counsel Robert Lipshutz, President Carter "insisted"
on a clear line of independent Department authority as to criminal cases without
White House interference."s' Under President Carter, communications with the
intelligence community or Department prosecutors had to be channeled through
the National Security Advisor, in consultation with the Counsel to the President
if an individual's privacy interests were involved.'`0
Under Lipshutz, White House Counsel's staff of five attorneys "relied
very heavily on, for our background legal work, the Department of Justice.""9
However, Lipshutz described the limits on his coordination with Attorney
General Bell: "I clearly respected his absolute authority without any interference
from the White House, including the President, on criminal matters." 92 As White
House Counsel, he saw policing strict noninterference by White House staff as
an essential element of his job.' The Carter administration's strict delineation
of roles traced directly back to the damaging Nixon era. Per Lipshutz, "one of
the most undermining things we've had in recent years is the involvement of the
Rumsfeld Memorandum, supra note 178, at 3.
187
See Ford White House Standards, supra note 153, at ¶ 1.
188
Bell Address, supra note 1, at 3.
189
Exit interview by Marie Allen with Robert J. Lipshutz, Counsel to the President, Presidential
Papers
Staff,
in
Washington,
D.C.,
15
(Sept.
29,
1979),
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/oralhistories/exitinterviews/Lipshutz.pd
f.
190
See id. at 25.
191
Id. at 14.
192
Id. at 15.
193
See id. ("I monitored the White House to make sure it was kept that way.").
186
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White House in matters involving criminal justice which should be exclusively
the purview of the Department of Justice."
iii.

94

The Reagan Administration

President Reagan's first Counsel, Fred Fielding, established White
House contacts policies in a series of memoranda. Twenty days after the

inauguration, Fielding issued a one-page placeholder guidance restricting White
House staff from communicating with the Department." It admonished staff of
the "imperative that there be public confidence in the effective and impartial
administration of the laws." 196 It required that all inquiries by the White House
staff about pending criminal matters be directed to the Counsel to the
President.' Five months later, Fielding issued a comprehensive set of agency
contacts policies.198 As to criminal investigations, the new standards of conduct
clarified that the prior memorandum's "ban on contacts extends to the litigating;
investigative and adjudicatory divisions of the department of justice."' 99 The
standards required that, while the White House Office is not covered by the
Privacy Act of 1974, staff must "confer with the Counsel's Office before making
inquiries of agencies with respect to particular individuals." 2 0
iv.

The George H. W Bush Administration

C. Boyden Gray, President George H.W. Bush's White House Counsel,
issued broad restrictions on White House contacts with agencies.2 0 1 The directive
covered both independent and traditional executive agencies. 202 The policy

194

Id.

Memorandum from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, on Communications with the
Department of Justice for the White House 'Staff 1 (Feb. 10, 1981), [hereinafter February 1981
Fielding
Memorandum],
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smof/counsel/roberts/box-035/40485-6908381-035-003-2017.pdf.
195

196

Id.

See id.
See Memorandum from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, on Standards of Conduct:
Contact with Independent Regulatory Agencies, Investigative and Intelligence Departments and
Agencies, and Procurement Agencies for the White House Staff (July 13, 1981) [hereinafter July
1981
Fielding
Memorandum],
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smof/cos/cicconilbox- 11/40-946914308-011-006-2016.pdf.
199
Id. at 3.
197

198

200

Id.

Memorandum from C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to the President, on Prohibited Contacts with
Agencies for White House Staff(1989) [hereinafter Gray Memorandum].
202
Id at 1.
201
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applied with particular emphasis to a variety of specified functions, 2 03 including
criminal investigations. Gray notes that the "ban on contacts extends to the
litigating, investigative and adjudicatory divisions of the Department of
Justice."20 4 Public confidence in the evenhanded administration of law calls for
contacts restrictions with the Department. 20 5 The first Bush White House policies
required that any inquiries touching on "particular pending investigations or
cases" handled by the Department must be made by the Counsel to the
President.2 06
v.

The Clinton Administration

The Clinton administration likewise restricted contacts between the
White House and the Department. Attorney General Janet Reno articulated the
governing principles in a letter to the White House.20 7 She informed the White
House that the Department would only advise the White House about pending
civil or criminal matters "where important for the performance of the President's
duties and where appropriate from a law enforcement perspective."208
As White House Counsel, Jack Quinn issued White House contacts
policies governing the staff of the Executive Office of the President (EOP).2 09
The Quinn Memorandum defined "investigations" as "matters related to
investigating or reviewing potential or actual administrative, criminal or civil
charges for alleged violations of law or regulations by specific individuals or
entities."210 It noted there may be "rare, special circumstances when it is
appropriate for the White House to communicate with an agency about a pending
investigation, enforcement action, or adjudication," but it required any such
communication to be "initiated by either the White House Counsel or the Deputy
Counsel." 211
203
The Gray Memorandum identifies investigative, adjudicatory, intelligence, procurement,
and independent regulatory functions.
204
Id. at 3.
205
See id. at 4 ("As we are all keenly aware, it is imperative that there be public confidence in
the effective and impartial administration of the laws.").
206
Id. at 4-5.
207
See Letter from Janet Reno, Att'y Gen., to Lloyd N. Cutler, Special Counsel to the President
(Sept. 29, 1994).
208
Id.
209
See Quinn Memorandum, supranote 176, at 1. While it evolves over time, the EOP contains
a number of components in addition to the White House Office staff, which typically include the
Office of the Vice President, National Security Council staff, Office of Management & Budget,
Office of the United States Trade Representative, and Office of National Drug Control Policy. See
generally HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-606 GOV, THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW (Nov. 26, 2008).
210
Quinn Memorandum, supra note 176, at 2.
211
Id. at 3.
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The George W Bush Administration

Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a memorandum outlining Bush
administration contacts policy on April 15, 2002.212 Like previous
administrations, Ashcroft stressed the importance of the Department's
legitimacy. He noted the "imperative that there be public confidence that the laws
of the United States are administered and enforced in an impartial manner." 213
He, too, limited communication with the White House about pending criminal
matters "only when doing so is important for the performance of the President's
duties and appropriate from a law enforcement . .. perspective." 2 14 It carved out
an exception for direct communication between the National Security Council
and Office of Homeland Security on pending investigations and cases involving
national security matters.215 However, the Ashcroft policy had the effect of
permitting at least 417 White House staff members to communicate with at least
42 Justice Department employees on matters not involving national security."'
During President Bush's second term, Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales issued revised guidance,217 which had the effect of increasing the
number of people within the EOP authorized to communicate with the
Department of Justice.2 18 According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the
Gonzales policy permitted at least 895 executive branch personnel to speak to at
least 42 people in the Department about non-national security matters.2 19 In
contrast, under the Reno policy only seven people total were designated for initial
communication between the White House and Department regarding pending
investigations and cases.220
The Bush administration caused a firestorm when the White House
removed a number of U.S. attorneys following the 2004 presidential election.2
Attorney General Michael Mukasey tightened the Bush Administration

212
Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., on Department of Justice Communications
with the White House, for Heads of Dep't Components and U. S. Att'ys (Apr. 15, 2002)
[hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum], https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/110thcongress/senate-report/203/1.
213
Id.atl.
214

Id
Id. at 2.
216
See S. REP. No. 110-203, at 3 (2007).
217
See Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen., on Communications with the
Executive Office of the President for Heads of Dep't Components and U. S. Att'ys (May 4, 2006)
[hereinafter Gonzales Memorandum].
218
See id.
219
See S. REP. No. 110-203.
220
See id. at 2.
221
See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, "The US. Attorneys Scandal" and the Allocation
ofProsecutorialPower, 69 Om1o ST. L.J. 187, 187 (2008) (explaining the controversy).
215
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restrictions on Department communications with the White House in the wake
of the controversy. 222 Mukasey later circulated revised guidance. 223 After listing
numerous legitimate areas in which the White House and the Department "must
be able to communicate freely," 224 he notes that "[c]ommunications with respect
to pending criminal or civil-enforcement matters . . . must be limited."225
Numerous internal and congressional reports found that political considerations
improperly influenced a number of personnel decisions. Thereafter, Attorney
General Michael Mukasey reaffirmed that the "mission of the Justice Department
is the evenhanded application of the Constitution and the laws enacted under
it."226 He undertook a number of reforms, including strengthening of the
Department's White House contacts policy. 22 7
vii.

The ObamaAdministration

In the Obama administration, Attorney General Eric Holder opened the
Department's White House contacts policy with a declaration: "The legal
judgments of the Department of Justice must be impartial and insulated from
political influence. It is imperative that the Department's investigatory and
prosecutorial powers be exercised free from partisan considerations." 22 8 He also
noted that the policy was "developed in consultation with, and have the full
support of, the Counsel to the President."' The Obama White House also

See Memorandum from Michael Mukasey, Att'y Gen., on Communications with the White
House, for Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Att'ys (Dec. 19,2007) [hereinafter 2007 Mukasey
Memorandum].
223
See Memorandum from Michael Mukasey, Att'y Gen., on Communications with the White
House for Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Att'ys (Dec. 19,2009) [hereinafter 2009 Mukasey
Memorandum] (noting he is updating the 2008 "memorandum outlining procedures that govern
communications between the Department of Justice and the White House" in order "to ensure that
everyone is aware of the rules and of their importance").
224
Id. at 1.
225
Id
226
See Michael B. Mukasey, Att'y Gen., Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Michael B.
Mukasey Before the American Bar Association (Aug. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Mukasey Remarks]
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2008/ag-speech-0808121.html.
227
See id. ("In December, shortly after becoming Attorney General, I revised the Department's
White House contacts policy and significantly narrowed the list of those who may communicate
with the White House about ongoing criminal and civil enforcement matters.").
228
Holder Memorandum, supranote 181, at 1.
229
Id. Gregory Craig was White House Counsel at the time. See Anne E. Komblut & Ellen
Nakashima, White House Counsel Poised to Give Up Post, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/11/13/AR2009111300071.html?noredirect-on.
222
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implemented mirror-image policies restricting staff contact with the
Department.23 0
The Holder Memorandum outlines the central curiosity of the Take Care
Clause as it relates to criminal prosecutions. In order for the President to meet
his Take Care Clause obligations, the Department of Justice must regularly
withhold information about particular criminal and civil investigations from the
President and his White House advisers. Holder notes:
In order to ensure the President's ability to perform his
constitutional obligation to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed," the Justice Department will advise the White House
concerning pending or contemplated criminal or civil
investigations or cases when-but only when-it is important
for the performance of the President's duties and appropriate
from a law enforcement perspective.231
This language makes it clear that communication with the White House about
active matters is the rare exception rather than the rule. In those rare instances
calling for contacts, the Obama administration policy restricted "initial
communications" to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General on the
Department side, and the Counsel to the President, Principal Deputy Counsel to
the President, President, and Vice President. This very small cadre of designated
individuals ensures that all contact can be closely monitored and managed in
order to protect the enforcement function.
viii.

The Trump Administration

During President Trump's first week in office, Counsel to the President,
Donald F. McGahn, II, issued a memorandum to the White House staff outlining
communications restrictions with personnel at the Department of Justice.23 2 The
Trump White House contacts policy articulates the purpose "to ensure that DOJ
exercises its investigatory and prosecutorialfunctions free from the fact or
appearance of improper political influence."2 33 It acknowledges that the
Department "advises the White House about contemplated or pending
investigations or enforcement actions under specific guidelines issued by the
Attorney General."234 Like prior administrations, it appoints the White House

230
See Memorandum from Kathryn Ruemmler, Att'y Gen., on Prohibited Contacts with
Agencies and Departments for All White House Office Staff, (Mar. 23, 2012) [hereinafter the
Ruemmler Memorandum].
231
Holder Memorandum, supranote 181, at 1.
232
See McGahn Memorandum, supranote 42.
233

Id. at 1 (emphasis in original).

234
Id. At the time the McGahn Memorandum was issued, President Trump had nominated thenSen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) to be Attorney General, but he had not yet been confirmed. Obama
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Counsel's office as the gatekeeper of communications with the Department.2 35
Scrutiny of White House pressure on the Department has generated criticism of
the Trump administration's adherence to its contacts policy, as well as its
substance. 23 6 From the Department side, it appears the Holder Memorandum
remained in effect during the first year of the Trump administration.
2.

Core Features of White House-Department Contacts Policies

The post-Watergate contacts policies share a number of features that
have shaped the primary modality of Executive Branch enforcement of the
principle of noninterference in criminal prosecutions. These features act as
prophylaxis against violations of the Take Care Clause.
i.

Front Office GatekeeperRoles

The White House Counsel's Office and the Office of the Attorney
General serve as the primary gatekeepers of White House-Department contacts.
From the White House side, the Counsel's Office takes the primary role in
drafting the contacts policy that will govern the President's most immediate staff.
Counsel's Office traditionally approves or disapproves contacts sought by any
White House actor, including the President. Furthermore, White House lawyers
typically monitor and attend any such contacts when approved.to ensure that the
integrity of law enforcement is scrupulously honored. The Attorney General, or
her designee, fulfills a similar function for the Department. These constrictions
on the channels of contact ensure that such contacts will be considered in advance
and policed accordingly.
ii.

Restrictionsand Exemptions Follow Function

White House contacts policies reflect the practical governing realities of
the dual function paradox discussed in Section III.B.5 above. Aside from the
front office gatekeeping process, the restrictions and exemptions of White House
Administration holdover Sally Yates was Acting Attorney General. See Matt Zapotosky, Trump
Has Fired the Acting Attorney General Who Ordered Justice Dept. Not to Defend President's
Travel Ban, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/acting-attorney-general-an-obama-administration-holdover-wont-defend-trumpimmigration-order/2017/01/30/a9846f02-e727-1 le6-b82f687d6e6a3e7cstory.html?utm term=.3b58a8babl98. Former Attorney General Eric Holder's
guidelines on Department contacts with the White House were in force. See Holder Memorandum,
supranote 181.
235
See McGahn Memorandum, supra note 42.
236
See, e.g., Letter from Allison F. Murphy, Counsel, United to Protect Democracy, to Donald
McGahn, II, White House Counsel (Apr. 18, 2017), https://protectdemocracy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/20170418-Letter-to-Donald-McGahn-re-Agency-Contacts-Policy.pdf
(criticizing the scope and enforcement of the White House contacts policy).
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contacts policies follow functions rather than personnel. Prohibited contacts
protect criminal investigations and prosecutions, civil enforcement actions,
executive branch adjudications, formulation of objective legal analysis, and
formulation of intelligence analysis. In contrast, it is generally permissible for
White House staff to communicate with executive branch agencies regarding
policy, legislative, and administrative issues.237 The policies allow contacts for
the President to obtain national security threat information and legal advice, to
consult on judicial nominations, to guide broad policy objectives and resource
allocation, and to manage the Department's role in the interagency process.23 8
iii.

The Standardfor Exceptions as to Specific Matters

On a case-by-case basis, White House staff has been allowed to contact
the Department on matters that are not exempted. Several of the contacts policies
establish a standard for exceptions to the contact prohibitions: where such
information is "important for the performance of the President's duties and
appropriate from a law enforcement perspective."23 9 Of note, the Department
language is "and" not "or," indicating that the policy requires both conditions to
be satisfied before the contemplated White House contact with the Department
is permissible. I address each in turn.
a.

Contacts "Important for the Performance of
the President's Duties"

This prong of the exceptions standards evaluates the President's need for
Department information. One could see legitimate instances in which the
President and his aides need to be apprised of information about a specific
pending criminal matter. For example, the President's national security team
would need to be apprised of a terrorism-related criminal investigation because
it requires the President to coordinate an interagency threat response. The
Department might need to inform the White House about an imminent indictment
of a foreign national so the White House can address diplomatic fallout. Matters
of great public interest might call for routine briefings that do not jeopardize law
enforcement integrity.
The Department's mid-investigation disclosure to the White House
regarding the potential compromised status of then-National Security Advisor
Michael Flynn is a good example. Acting Attorney General Yates and a senior
member of the Department's National Security Division informed the White

See, e.g., Quinn Memorandum, supra note 176, at 2.
Moreover, the President's removal power, among other sources of leverage, maintains a
degree of residual supervisory control over the Department in order to take corrective action if
warranted and not inconsistent with Take Care Clause obligations.
239
See Holder Memorandum, supranote 181.
237
238
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House about a pending criminal investigation. However, the President could be
disabled in his role as Commander-in-Chief and the nation's chief diplomat if his
National Security Advisor is vulnerable to Russian intelligence leverage. The
White House needed an opportunity to safeguard itself from a national security
vulnerability. These disclosures were important for the performance of the
President's duties.
b. Contacts "Appropriate from a Law
Enforcement Perspective"
The second prong of the exceptions standard looks to whether the
proposed contact is appropriate from a law enforcement perspective. Here, the
focus is on the integrity of the investigation or prosecution, including the civil
liberties of the relevant witnesses and targets. Returning to the case of Flynn, the
Department disclosures appear to have met the standard of law enforcement
appropriateness, although it is a closer question. At that time, the Department
had intelligence-based information about the substance of Flynn's conversations
with the Russian Ambassador that flatly contradicted Flynn's representations to
the FBI. He was guilty of false statements,24 0 to which he subsequently pled
guilty.241 As such, a White House disclosure was not going to compromise an
investigation of that charge: it was a completed crime and the Department had
all the relevant evidence for the charge. However, I would provide a note or two
of caution. While Flynn's vulnerability to Russian compromise had been
established, an investigation into whether any Russian operatives made any
attempt to leverage Flynn likely would have required further investigation.
Disclosure to the White House, with a risk of disclosure to Flynn, could have
undermined an espionage investigation. Further, Flynn had significant
professional and reputational interests adversely affected by the Department's
disclosure. Those interests must factor into the White House contacts calculation
even if disclosure was ultimately warranted.
3.

Executive Branch Accountability Community

While the White House contacts policies are the starting point, other
Take Care Clause enforcement mechanisms emanate from the Executive Branch.
The executive branch accountability community24 2 also protects the criminal
prosecution function from undue influence. At the Department, the Office of
See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2018).
Statement of the Offense, United States v. Flynn, 2017 WL 5948711 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017)
(No. 1:17-cr-00232-RC).
242
These are largely comprised of congressionally created offices of inspectors general
established by the Inspectors General Act of 1978. There are also internal accountability entities
created by executive branch agencies themselves. See Inspector General for Agency, 50 U.S.C. §
3517 (2018).
240
241
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Professional Responsibility (OPR) and Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
have jurisdiction to investigate and enforce Department employee violations of
White House contacts policies.2 43 As an example, Attorney General Mukasey
credited OPR and OIG findings of improper political influence in hiring decision
as motivation for his revisions to the White House contacts policy. 2 44
4.

White House Aversion to Comment on Pending Cases

Presidential rhetoric and White House communications have also been
generally managed to avoid bringing political pressure to bear in criminal cases.
Presidential speech can have dramatic consequences in pending litigation.245
And, as Justice Jackson noted in the Steel Seizure Case, "[n]o other personality
in public life can begin to compete with [the president] in access to the public
mind through modern methods of communications." 2 4 The power of the bully
pulpit is significant, especially to the ear of a subordinate executive branch
official. The White House has traditionally avoided comment on pending
criminal investigations because of the perception of presidential control.247 The
concerns about presidential rhetoric mirror concerns about management control:
civil liberties and due process interests of individuals caught up in government
investigation, the consequences of a judicial finding that those interests were
violated by presidential action, and the apolitical and evenhanded administration
of criminal laws. For example, President Ronald Reagan assiduously avoided
comment on the case of John Hinckley, who gravely wounded and nearly
assassinated Reagan. 248 To be sure, a White House may act in political selfOPR and OIG do not, however, have jurisdiction over White House staff violations of the
White House contacts policy.
244
See Mukasey Remarks, supra note 226.
245
See Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: PresidentialSpeech in the Courts, 96 TEX.
L. REV. 71, 71 (2017) (noting that, at times, "presidential statements play a significant role in
judicial assessments of the meaning, lawfulness, or constitutionality of either legislation or
executive action").
246
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
247
See Luke M. Milligan, The "Ongoing CriminalInvestigation" Constraint: Getting Away
with Silence, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 747, 756 (2008) ("The White House has historically
behaved as though it were constrained from commenting on the merits, progress, or information
gathered during ongoing federal criminal investigations or prosecutions of which the President is
perceived to be at least nominally in control.").
248
See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Hinckley Is ClearedbutIs Held Insane in Reagan Attack, N.Y. TIMEs
(June 22, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/22/us/hinkley-is-cleared-but-is-held-insanein-reagan-attack.html ("No comment all the way. We haven't commented on any aspect of this,
and we won't comment now."). The President had a political incentive not to undermine the
legitimacy of legal proceedings against Hinckley by opening himself to the charge he was being
personally vindictive. But he also had a Take Care Clause obligation not to adversely affect the
administration of enforcement proceedings against Hinckley.
243
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interest by refusing to answer media questions scrutinizing the President's
administration on "ongoing criminal investigation" grounds.24 9
5.

Executive Objections to Congressional Interference in Criminal
Matters

The Executive Branch expresses this longstanding view on the central
importance of prosecutorial noninterference in other contexts. The Executive
Branch has advanced a parallel argument many times in an effort to resist
congressional oversight. The Holder Memorandum, for example, covers
Department contacts with the White House and Congress. 250 The Executive
Branch has repeatedly resisted production to Congress of material related to open
criminal matters."' It has argued that congressional requests threaten to

249
See Milligan, supranote 247, at 741 ("In many minds, the invocation of this constraint-no
matter the circumstances-reflexively transforms a White House stonewall into an instance of
'responsible' and 'principled' presidential restraint.").
250
See Holder Memorandum, supra note 181, at 2.

In order to ensure that Congress may carry out its legitimate investigatory and
oversight functions, the Department will respond as appropriate inquiries from
Congressional Committees consistent with the policies, laws, regulations, or
professional ethical obligations that may require confidentiality and consistent
with the need to avoid publicity that may undermine a particular investigation or
litigation.
Id.
251
See, e.g., Assertion of Executive Privilege with Respect to Prosecutorial Documents, 25 Op.
O.L.C. 1, 2 (2001) (opinion of Attorney General John D. Ashcroft); Response to Congressional
Requests for Information Regarding Decisions Made Under the Independent Counsel Act, 10 Op.
O.L.C. 68, 75-78 (1986) (explaining the Executive Branch's authority to withhold open and closed
law enforcement files from Congress); Position of the Executive Department Regarding
Investigative Reports, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 45, 49 (1941) (same concerning investigative files of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation); Letter from Eric Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., on Assertion of
Executive Privilege over Documents Generated in Response to Congressional Investigation into
Operation Fast and Furious to President Barack Obama
(June 9, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/file/20591/download (grounding the assertion of privilege, in part,
because Congress "sought information about ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions");
Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, Att'y Gen., on Assertion of Executive Privilege Concerning the
Special Counsel's Interviews of the Vice President and Senior White House Staff to President
George W. Bush (July 15, 2008), https://wwwjustice.gov/file/482156/download; Memorandum
Opinion from Robert B. Shanks, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., on Congressional Subpoenas of
Department of Justice Investigative Files for the Deputy Att'y Gen. (Oct. 17, 1984),
https://www.justice.gov/file/23686/download; Letter from William French Smith, Att'y Gen., to
John D. Dingell, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation, Comm. On Energy
and Commerce 1 (Nov. 30, 1982) [hereinafter Smith Letter] ("It is the policy of the Executive
Branch to decline to provide committees of Congress with access to or copies of law enforcement
files, or materials in investigative files whose disclosure might adversely affect a pending
enforcement action, overall enforcement policy, or the rights of individuals.").
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politicize the criminal prosecution function.252 While the Executive Branch has
yielded on numerous occasions,253 those capitulations are a function of the
leverage-based accommodation process that defines oversight disputes between
Congress and the Executive.254 Pennsylvania Avenue separates the branches as
a matter of constitutional role demarcation, but the principle of noninterference
extends to both political branches as the Executive understands its Take Care
Clause obligations.
B.

The Legislative Branch

Congress expresses its expectation of noninterference in particular law
enforcement matters by executive branch political appointees in numerous ways.
A 2007 Senate Judiciary Committee legislative report declared "Congress has a
compelling interest in protecting the Department of Justice from undue political
interference."25 5 It largely shapes the President's Take Care Clause obligations
by means of defining the "laws." Congress also uses other signals and sources of
leverage to reinforce the rhetoric, if not always the substance, of prosecutorial
integrity. 2 56

252
See Smith Letter, supra note 251, at 1 ("Congressional assurance of confidentiality cannot
overcome concern over the integrity of law enforcement files .. . because of the importance of
preventing direct congressional influence on investigations in progress."). See also Todd D.
Peterson, Congressional Oversight of Open Criminal Investigations, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1373, 1388 (2002) (arguing for a per se executive privilege assertion as to open criminal files
because congressional access creates an unacceptable "risk of politically influenced prosecutorial
action.").

253

See MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RES. SERV., LEGAL AND HISTORICAL SUBSTANTIALITY OF

FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL CIVLETTI'S VIEWS AS TO THE SCOPE AND REACH OF CONGRESS'S

AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT OVERSIGHT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, reprintedin EPA 's Criminal

Enforcement Program:Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 12--41 (1993) (outlining historical examples of
congressional inquiry into open federal criminal investigative matters).
254
See Andrew McCanse Wright, Constitutional Conflict and Congressional Oversight, 98
MARQ. L. REv. 881 (2014) (exploring leverage and accommodation in separation-of-powers
oversight disputes).
255
See S. REP. No. 110-203, at 2.
256
At times, Congress's calls for "independence" look a lot more like pressure for executive
officer fealty or a desired outcome than a true effort to insulate the Department from improper
pressure. The consistent deployment of a non-politicization argument, even when done cynically,
is a testament to the strength of the concept. Even now, in the most contested of issues related to
the Russia investigation, members of both parties claim the mantle of protecting the Department
from politicization. See Letter from GOP Members of the House Judiciary Comm. to Att'y Gen.
Jeff Sessions
and Deputy
Att'y Gen.
Rod Rosenstein
(July 27,
2017),
https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/072717_HJC-Letter-to-AG-DAG.pdf
(calling for the appointment of a second special counsel "to investigate a plethora of matters"
related to Democratic party officials, law enforcement, and intelligence professionals in order to
allow intelligence and investigation functions to be "fully unhindered by politics").
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1. Defining "Law"
As discussed in Section 171.A.4 above, Congress has the primary
constitutional role in writing the "laws" that define the President's Take Care
Clause obligations. First and foremost, Congress has established and provided
for substantive federal criminal law and the apparatus to enforce it. It has
protected line prosecutors and law enforcement officials from political
considerations in hiring and termination. Congress also passed a whole set of
criminal statutes designed to protect the integrity of criminal investigations and
related judicial proceedings.25 7 Embedded in those laws and functions is an
unmistakable expectation that the law will be enforced in particular matters
without regard to base political motives or personal interests by presidential
appointees, or the President himself.
2.

Senate Advice and Consent in Executive Nominations

The Senate often uses its confirmation power to establish expectations,
communicate norms, and extract commitments from presidential nominees.258
One of the Senate's chief lines of inquiry for presidential appointees to the
Department of Justice is its commitment to prosecutorial integrity and resistance
to undue political interference. 2 s9 The Senate Judiciary Committee regularly
communicates its expectations of law enforcement integrity and political
noninterference, starting with nominees for Attorney General 2" and extending

257
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2018) (influencing or injuring officer or juror generally); 18
U.S.C. § 1505 (2018) (obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees);
18 U.S.C. § 1510 (2018) (obstruction of criminal investigation).
258

See ALLISSA M. DOLAN ET. AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL30240, CONGRESSIONAL

OVERSIGHT MANUAL 20 (2014), http://fas.org/sqp/crs/misc/RL30240.pdf ("By establishing the
policy views of nominees, congressional hearings allow lawmakers to call appointed officials to
account at a later time."). See id at 20 (noting that since the post-Watergate reforms of the Ethics
in Government Act of 1978, "Senate committees are setting aside more time to probe the
qualifications, independence, and policy predilections of presidential nominees") (emphasis
added).
259
For a chart of the nominees and confirmation processes for Attorney General from Reagan
to Obama, see MAEVE P. CAREY & MICHAEL GREENE, CRS INSIGHTs, IN10192, ATTORNEY
GENERAL

NOMINATIONS

SINCE

THE

REAGAN

ADMINISTRATION

(2014),

http://whitehousetransitionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/AG-Noms-SinceReagan_120414-1.pdf.
260
See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Michael B. Mukasey to be Attorney
General of the United States Before the S Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 478 (2007).
Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy:
There is good reason why the rule of law requires that we have an Attorney
General and not merely a Secretary of the Department of Justice. This is a
different kind of Cabinet position. It is distinct from all others. It requires greater
independence. The departing Attorney General never understood this. Instead,
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to other senior Department of Justice appointees.26 1 In turn, Department
nominees offer assurances of Department independence.26 2
Given controversies over the Russia investigation, one particular
colloquy stands out in Robert Mueller's confirmation hearing to become FBI
he saw his role as a facilitator for the White House's overreaching partisan
policies and politics.
Id.
NominationofEric H Holder, Jr., Nominee to be Attorney Generalof the UnitedStates Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 403 (2009), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG11 1shrg56197/html/CHRG-111shrg56197.htm (statement by Sen. Mark Warner that the Attorney
General "will be the principal adviser to the president, and much has been said in the opening
statements by both of my distinguished colleagues, chairman and ranking member, about the
importance of the rule of law and independence") (statement by Sen. Schumer that "four years ago,
moreover, the question of independence was my central consideration when Alberto Gonzales sat
in the witness chair, that he was too close to the President, didn't understand the nature of the job
of Attorney General").
Senator Specter stated that
[n]ext to the President of the United States, there is no Federal officer more
important than the Attorney General. The Attorney General is different from any
other Cabinet officer because Cabinet officers ordinarily carry out the policies of
the President But the Attorney General has an independent duty to the people
and to uphold the rule of law.
Id.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Jeff Sessions to be Attorney Generalof The
United States: Hearing Before The S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 207 (2017),
https://www.congress.gov/115.chrg/shrg28637/CHRG-115shrg28637.pdf, (statement by Sen.
Charles Grassley that "[wihen he has questioned other candidates for the Office of Attorney
General, he has made plain the priorities of an attorney general's independence").
261
For example, David Ogden, nominee to be Deputy Attorney General, assured Sen. Ted
Kaufman that his top priority, after national security, was "issues related to the rule of law:
restoring nonpartisanship, ensuring the protection of investigations from inappropriate influence,
protecting career hiring from inappropriate influence, dealing with transparency issues like some
of those that have been discussed, all of which I group as any rule of law bucket." Patrick Leahy,
Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee-Nomination of David Ogden for Deputy Attorney
General, VOTE SMART (Feb. 5, 2009), https://votesmart.org/public-statement/406489/hearing-ofthe-senate-judiciary-committee-nomination-of-david-ogden-for-deputy-attorneygeneral#.W6msOXtKhph.
262
See, e.g., S. Doc. No. 111-403, supra note 260. Eric Holder stated during his confirmation
hearing:
If confirmed by the Senate, I pledge to you and to my fellow citizens that I will
faithfully execute my duties as Attorney General of the United States of
America. I will do so by adhering to the precepts and the principles of the
Constitution, and I will do so in a fair, just, and independent manner.
Id.
Nominee for FBI Director Testifies Before Senate, CNN
(July 12, 2017),
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1707/12/cnr.04.html (Wray stating "in conclusion, I
pledge to be the leader that the FBI deserves-and to lead an independent Bureau that will make
every American proud").
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Director. Then a Senator, Sessions asked Mueller about whether he would
approach Congress if he felt undue political pressure were being brought to bear
by the President:
I do not exclude the possibility that the circumstances would be
such that I would feel it necessary to circumvent the ordinary
course of proceedings by-which would be to go to the Attorney
General first before I made perhaps a disclosure to Congress.
But I am not precluding the possibility that given the necessary
independence of the Bureau in investigation, that there might not
come a time where one seeks an alternative where one believes
that political pressure is being brought to bear on the
investigative process. That may be somewhere else in the
Executive, beyond the Attorney General. It may be Congress,
but I would look and explore every option if I believed that the
FBI was being pressured for political reasons. And if that were
the situation as described here, I would explore other
alternatives or a variety of alternatives in order to make certain
that justice was done.2 63
In tension with the independence concern, Senators also expressed concerns
about democratic accountability in light of historical law enforcement abuses.264
In this give and take, confirmation hearings have become an important forum for
expectation setting and extracted commitments, with a substantial focus on
insulation from political interference.26 5
3. Congressional Oversight
Congress can use its oversight power to send the President signals about
investigative noninterference. And it has done so. In recent years, congressional
oversight inquiries into the George W. Bush Administration's removal of U.S.
attorneys, problematic Bush and Obama era gun trafficking investigations called
Operation Fast and Furious, and Obama Administration Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton's email use all have had investigative threads that questioned
whether the White House had inappropriately contacted or pressured the

263
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Robert S. Mueller, III to be Directorof the
FederalBureau of Investigation:Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 514 (2001)
(statement of Robert S. Mueller, III).
264
See, e.g., id (Sen. Patrick Leahy: "We received testimony in our oversight hearings that too
often the independence that is part of the FBI's culture, and a respected part, has instead, though,
crossed over into the line of not being independence but arrogance.").
265
The words "independent" and "independence" were used 76 times during Holder's
confirmation hearings, and 56 times during Michael Mukasey's. See S. Doc. No. 111-403, supra
note 260; S. Doc. No. 110-478, supra note 260.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss2/4

60

Wright: The Take Care Clause, Justice Department Independence, and White

WHITE HOUSE CONTROL

2018]

413

Department. Congressional committee members have also used hearings to press
witnesses on the Department's White House contacts policies. 266
4.

Legislative Responses to Presidential Overreach

Aside from defining "law" for purposes of the Take Care Clause,
Congress may also use its legislative power to insulate the criminal prosecution
function from undue White House political interference. Congress could use
Department authorities' reauthorization or appropriation cycles as leverage to
correct what it perceives to be abuses of the Take Care Clause. If the President
seeks funding for prioritized operations (say, immigration enforcement) or
important surveillance authorities, Congress has an opportunity to influence
presidential behavior.
In addition, as previously noted, Congress passed a series of postWatergate laws designed to strengthen government ethics and protect the
integrity of criminal prosecutions and other enforcement functions. After the
Bush administration U.S. attorney controversy, the Senate Judiciary Committee
considered legislation "to provide for limitations between the Department of
Justice and the White House Office relating to civil and criminal
investigations.""' The Committee observed: "The effectiveness and integrity of
the administration of justice depends on the Department of Justice (the
Department) operating free of political interference. The most dangerous
potential source of such interference is the White House."268 At that time,
Democrats held the majority and directed their critiques at the George W. Bush
Administration. When the roles are reversed, Republicans, too, make similar
arguments. In light of President Trump's provocations, the Senate is considering
two bipartisan legislative proposals that would codify legal protections for the
Office of the Special Counsel from interference by the White House. 269 Thus,
subject to constitutional limitations, Congress can police the President's Take
Care Clause obligations by means of substantive legal constraints on his
authority vis-A-vis the Department's prosecution function.

See, e.g., S. REP. No. 110-203 (2007) (recounting Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse's (D-R.I.)
request for a justification from Attorney General Alberto Gonzales for "[kicking] the portal so wide
open that this many people [in the EOP] can now engage directly about criminal cases and matters,
compared to before" detailing Sen. Whitehouse's enhanced concerns, during June 29, 2007, about
White House-Justice Department contacts following his discovery of the Gonzales Memorandum).
267
See id. at 1.
268
Id. at 2.
269
See Special Counsels and the Separation ofPowers, COMMITTE ON THE JuDIcIARY (Sept.
26, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/special-counsels-and-the-separation-ofpowers (taking testimony on the constitutionality and advisability of S. 1735, the "Special Counsel
Independence Protection Act" (the Graham-Booker bill) and S. 1741, the "Special Counsel
Integrity Act" (the Tillis-Coons bill)).
266
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5. Censure
Congress may use an expression of censure as a sanction against
perceived abuse of the President's Take Care Clause obligations. 27 0 There is no
express censure power specified in the Constitution, but it has long been used as
a sanction by Congress.2 71 It does not have legal effect aside from the reputational
stain it bears. While it is primarily used to police its own members, Congress has
censured Presidents on several occasions.272 Congress could clearly use that
platform to voice condemnation of presidential interference in Department
enforcement functions.
6.

Impeachment

The Constitution grants Congress power to remove the President and
certain other executive branch officials by means of impeachment. 273 The House
of Representatives has the "sole Power of Impeachment." 274 The Senate has the
"sole Power to try all Impeachments" and may convict upon a two-thirds vote.27 5
There is a longstanding debate about whether the phrase "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" has substantive content or is merely a reflection of the political
determination of Congress. 276 The Articles of Impeachment against President
"Censure" is the "formal resolution of a legislative, administrative, or other body
reprimanding a person, normally one of its own members, for specified conduct." Censure,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
270

271

See JACK MASKELL, CRS REPORT FOR CONG., CENSURE OF THE PRESIDENT BY THE CONGRESS

(1998), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-843.pdf.
272
The Senate censured President Andrew Jackson in 1934. Id. at 5. The House has censured
Presidents John Tyler, James Buchanan, and James K. Polk. Id. at 5-6. During his 1998 Senate
impeachment trial, an attempt to have Bill Clinton censured instead of removed from office failed.
273
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
274
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
275
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 6-7.
276
See ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. REs. SERV., 98-186 IMPEACHMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF
CONSTrrUTIONAL

PROVISIONS,

PROCEDURE,

AND

PRACTICE

22

(2010),

&

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-186.pdf ("Thus treason and bribery may be fairly clear as to their
meanings, but the remainder of the language has been the subject of considerable debate."). See
also Neal Kumar Katyal, Impeachment as CongressionalConstitutionalInterpretation,63 J. L.
CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (2000) (discussing Congress as the venue for constitutional interpretation
of the phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors"); Alex Simpson, Jr., FederalImpeachments, 64 U.
PA. L. REv. 651, 676-95 (1916) (arguing there was confusion as to the meaning of the phrase "high
Crimes and Misdemeanors" at the Constitutional Convention). For more on impeachment, see
generally BRIAN C. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS (2012); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT

ANDREW JOHNSON (1992); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fetishism and the Clinton

Impeachment Debate, 85 VA. L. REV. 631 (1999).
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Nixon that passed out of the House Judiciary Committee were largely grounded
in obstruction of a criminal investigation as a violation of the President's Take
Care Clause obligations.
The first Article of Impeachment of President Nixon alleged:
In his conduct of the office of President of the United States,
Richard M. Nixon, in violation of.. . his constitutional duty to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented,
obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice ....
Subsequent [to the Watergate break-in], Richard M. Nixon,
using the powers of his high office, engaged personally and
through his close subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct
or plan designed to delay, impede, and obstruct the investigation
of such illegal entry; to cover up, conceal and protect those
responsible; and to conceal the existence and scope of other
unlawful covert activities. 277
The remainder of that Article lays out specific means Nixon used in that effort,
including making false statements, withholding material evidence, and suborning
perjury.2 It also charged President Nixon with "interfering or endeavoring to
interfere with the conduct of investigations by the Department of Justice of the
United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the office of Watergate
Special Prosecution Force, and Congressional Committees." 7 9 The second
Article of Impeachment likewise focused on President Nixon's violation of the
Take Care Clause by "impairing the due and proper administration of Justice."2 80
Because President Nixon resigned from office, the House did not vote on the
resolution.2 8 1
Impeachment is an extraordinary remedy. When an executive official is
convicted, the impeachment process supplants the President's removal power.
When invoked against a President or Vice President, it overturns an election.
Impeachment exacts tremendous political costs on Congress and the political
system overall. It remains, however, at Congress's disposal to regulate a Take
Care Clause violation of sufficient gravity to revisit the President's fitness for
office.

277
Articles of Impeachment, WATERGATE.INFO http://watergate.info/impeachment/articles-ofimpeachment (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
278

Id.

279

Id

280

Id.

See H. R. Res 803, 93d Cong. (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1305 (1974) (This is the House
Judiciary Committee report recommending President Nixon's impeachment).
281
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C. The JudicialBranch
A Take Care Clause violation by the President is enforced largely as a
constitutional question to be decided by Congress rather than the courts. Federal
courts have addressed the Take Care Clause in a number of contexts. Goldsmith
and Manning effectively demonstrate the "protean" uses to which the Supreme
Court puts the Clause.282 It has been willing, on occasion, to use the Take Care
Clause's expression of legislative supremacy to constrain presidential conduct.283
The Supreme Court has also construed the Clause to be a source of presidential
duty. However, judicial opinions enforcing a presidential Take Care obligation
have been conspicuously rare.284
The binary logic of legal enforcement of a statute or constitutional
provision is violation or compliance. To be sure, there is room in judicial
methodology for tests that balance factors and assess the totality of
circumstances, but there is still an underlying expectation that judges will draw
defensible and replicable lines. The Take Care Clause duty of good faith
stewardship calls for presidential flexibility and discernment. Its enforcement
must match that spectral quality. In this sense, the Take Care Clause tends to lack
"judicially discoverable and manageable standards" as described in political
question doctrine. 28 5

Thus, coercive enforcement of the President's Take Care obligations not
to interfere with the prosecution function is better committed to the people's
representatives in Congress through the impeachment process. Every
controversial and aggressive decision a president makes in tension with good
faith or care in the execution of laws saps popular support and breeds popular
assessments of Take Care violations. Eventually, the president's bad faith can
reach a tipping point in which the president's maladministration transcends
partisan affiliation to a degree that sanction for a Take Care violation takes on its
own democratic legitimacy.
V. CONCLUSION

The Take Care Clause governs-and limits-presidential authority over
the Department of Justice. White House relations with the Department require
sensitive navigation. It requires scrupulous compartmentalization between those
Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The ProteanTake Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REv. 837
(2016) (offering examples of the Supreme Court's different interpretations of the Take Care
Clause).
283
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952).
284
See Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238 slip op. at 2 n.3 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/15-40238-CVO.pdf
("We find it
unnecessary, at this early stage of the proceeding, to address the challenge based on the Take Care
Clause.").
285
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
282
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Department functions and activities about which communication and contact
with the White House is essential, permissible, or prohibited. In those rare
instances in which presidential duties require an otherwise prohibited contact
about an enforcement function, precautions must be undertaken to ensure that
the contact does not compromise the civil liberties of suspects and the
evenhanded administration of justice.
Further, all White House actors, including the President, may be subjects
of criminal investigation during and after their official tenure. The bedrock
American conception of the rule of law presupposes that the President and close
advisors are not above the law, but subjects to it. Federal law enforcement may
investigate White House actors for potential criminal violations related to their
official duties or wholly unrelated to them. Then, the. President's Take Care
Clause obligation not to interfere with criminal investigations and prosecutions
takes on greater urgency. Material violations of Take Care Clause
noninterference obligations by a President whose White House is under criminal
investigation would convulse the American body politic and threaten
constitutional crisis.
The United States stands on the precipice of that level of politico-legal
trauma at the conclusion of the Trump administration's first year. President
Trump has mismanaged the Department relationship by approaching it as a
subordinate entity subject to command and control. Rather, the Department has
varied functions, some of which the Take Care Clause would caution against
direct White House involvement. Worse, President Trump's most aggressive acts
with respect to the Department have been designed to thwart an investigation
bearing on his personal and political interests.
Absent overriding considerations, the President and his White House
staff must stand at arms' length from specific law enforcement and prosecution
matters. This concept is not merely a political version of polite etiquette or
"mere" norms. Rather it is part-in-parcel of the President's obligation to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed. Or, put another way, we must understand it
as a constitutional injunction. Only then can the Executive ensure it lives up to
Attorney General Bell's admonition that "the Department must be recognized by
all citizens as a neutral zone, in which neither favor nor pressure nor politics is
permitted to influence the administration of the law." 28 6

286

Bell Address, supra note 1, at 13.
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